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Abstract
We build a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous producers and
financial frictions (collateral constraints and incompleteness). First, we provide a char-
acterization to check whether a sequence is an equilibrium or not. Second, we study
the effects of financial imperfections on output and land prices. Third, we develop a
theory of valuation of land by introducing the notion of endogenous land dividends
(or yields) and different concepts of land-price bubbles. Some examples of bubbles are
provided in economies with and without short-sales.
Keywords: Infinite-horizon, general equilibrium, collateral constraint, incomplete
markets, asset valuation, rational bubbles.
JEL Classifications: C62, D53, D9, E44, G10.
1 Introduction
The interplay between asset prices and economic activities is an important topic, especially
after the Great Recession. A vast literature has flourished on this transmission mechanism
focusing on the notion of asset-price bubble. Many articles have addressed this issue in
overlapping generations (OLG) models (Tirole, 1985; Farhi and Tirole, 2012; Martin and
Ventura, 2012) while others have adopted an infinite-lived agent’s approach (Tirole, 1982;
Santos and Woodford, 1997; Kocherlakota, 2009; Hirano and Yanagawa, 2017). However,
most of this literature ignores the productive role of assets. Our paper aims to develop a
theory of asset valuation in the case the asset is not only a collateral but also an input.
We contribute to explain the asset pricing in terms of production activity. Although many
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papers have raised the question of asset valuation, most of them have focused on assets with
exogenous positive dividends (Lucas, 1978; Santos and Woodford, 1997) or zero dividend
(Bewley, 1980; Tirole, 1985; Pascoa et al., 2011). Unlike this literature, in our paper, every
agent can use the asset to produce the consumption good according to her own technology.
More precisely, we consider an infinite-horizon general equilibrium model with three assets: a
consumption good, land (to produce the consumption good), and a short-live financial asset
with zero supply. There is a finite number of agents who differ in terms of endowments,
technology, preferences and borrowing limits. In each period, agents may produce, exchange
and consume. In the spirit of Geanakoplos and Zame (2002) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
agents can borrow but must hold land as collateral. The repayment does not exceed a given
fraction of land income (the sum of the value of land and its fruit) because there is lack of
commitment.
We start our exposition by proving that a list of prices and allocations constitutes an
equilibrium if and only if it satisfies first-order, transversality, and market clearing conditions
as well as budget and borrowing constraints. The challenge and key point is the necessity of
transversality conditions. To prove this, we develop the methods in Kamihigashi (2002) and
Araujo et al. (2011), Pascoa et al. (2011). Our necessary and sufficient condition allows us to
check whether a sequence is an equilibrium or not. It should be noticed that our proof can
apply to a large class of general equilibrium models used in macroeconomics. It contributes
to the novelty of the paper.
The general equilibrium perspective is suitable to represent the interference between
financial markets and economic activities. Some of equilibrium properties deserve mention.
(1) In deterministic economies, if any agent produces (this happens under Inada’s con-
dition), then agents’ marginal productivities turn out to be the same. Cases where some
agents give up the production are quite specific: they experience a very low productivity
while the others have high productivity and a full access to credit markets. However, it
should be noticed that when financial markets are incomplete or agents are prevented from
borrowing, the most productive agent may not buy land to produce. We provide examples
illustrating this idea.
(2) The steady state analysis is carried out in a simple case.1 In the long run, the most
patient agent may not hold the entire stock of land. This result challenges the well-known
Ramsey’s conjecture (the most patient individual owns all the capital in the long run) and
looks more realistic. The very reason is that, in our model, any agent is a producer differently
from what happens in the growth literature where consumers rent capital to a representative
firm (see Becker and Mitra (2012) among others).
The last part of the paper develops a theory of land valuation. We focus on rational
land-price bubbles and their economic consequences.2 The standard literature (Lucas, 1978;
Santos and Woodford, 1997) considers long-lived assets paying exogenous dividends. In our
model, any agent may produce with a landowner-specific technology which may be non-
linear; this prevents the standard approach from applying. Now, one unit of land yields
an endogenous amount of consumption good in the next period, the so-called dividend or
added-value of land. In deterministic economies,3 (γt, dt) is called a process of state-prices
and land dividends if the the following intertemporal asset-pricing equation holds:
qt = γt+1 (qt+1 + dt+1) (1)
1The steady state may not exist when endowments are not stationary.
2A survey on bubbles with asymmetric information, overlapping generations, heterogeneous beliefs can
be found in Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2012).
3For the sake of simplicity, we mention here only the deterministic case. The stochastic one is presented
in Section 6.
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jointly with the condition that the dividend dt+1 is higher than the lowest marginal produc-
tivity of agents (the latter condition is required because every agent is allowed to produce).
Here, qt is the land price in terms of consumption good. Equation (1) is a no-arbitrage con-
dition: what we pay today to buy 1 unit of land is equal to what we will receive by reselling
1 unit of land plus land dividends (in terms of consumption good). Of course, when agents
share the same linear technology, we recover the Lucas’ tree with exogenous dividends. San-
tos and Woodford (1997) and Montrucchio (2004) also use no-arbitrage conditions to define
state-price process. They then use them to evaluate assets having exogenous dividends in
economies with incomplete financial markets.
In our economy, land plays three different roles: once we buy land, we can (1) resell it,
(2) use it to produce or (3) to borrow (collateral role). The land dividend represents the
two last roles. According to the literature (Tirole, 1982; Santos and Woodford, 1997), the
fundamental value of land is defined at equilibrium as the sum of the discounted values of
such endogenous dividends and the bubble is the (positive) difference between the price of
land and its fundamental value. Our approach is suitable not only for deterministic but also
for stochastic economies.
Our general result indicates that when agents are uniformly impatient, for any process
of state-price and dividends such that the discounted value of aggregate consumption good
vanishes at the infinity, the price of land equals its fundamental value. This can be viewed
as an extension of Theorem 3.3 in Santos and Woodford (1997)4 to the case of productive
assets. We also prove that, under uniform impatience in bounded economies, bubbles are
ruled out for any process of state-price and dividends.
The assumption of uniform impatience can be removed in the case of deterministic
economies. In such a case, we find out some interesting features. Let us mention two of
them. First, a land-price bubble arises only if the borrowing constraints of some agent are
binding infinitely many times.5 Indeed, when the borrowing constraints are not binding, the
marginal rates of substitution of all agents are the same and, hence, the no-bubble condition
becomes equivalent to a no-Ponzi scheme. Since the transversality conditions are satisfied,
the no-bubble condition is verified as well. Second, there is always one agent whose expected
value of land equals the land price.
We also provide some new examples of bubbles in economies with and without short-sales.
In the first one, agents are prevented from borrowing, their endowments fluctuate over time
and/or technologies are non-stationary. Some agents face a drop in endowments at time t,
but are unable to borrow and transfer wealth from period t+ 1 to period t. Thus, they may
buy land at date t−1 at a higher price, independent on their technologies, in order to transfer
their wealth from date t− 1 to date t. When the agents’ TFP goes to zero, the fundamental
value of land tends to zero as well, below the above level of price. By consequence, a land
bubble arises. In the second example, short-sales are allowed but borrowing constraints still
work. As in the first example, at any date, at least one agent is forced to save, hence she
may accept to buy land at a higher price or to buy a financial asset with low interest rates.
Therefore, bubbles may occur.
Our concept of land bubble contributes to the literature on bubbles of assets delivering
endogenous dividends. Among others, three approaches deserve mention.
Araujo et al. (2011), Pascoa et al. (2011) introduce and study concepts of bubbles of
4Theorem 3.3 in Santos and Woodford (1997) shows that, under uniform impatience, assets in positive net
supply and exogenous dividend have no bubble for state-prices that yield finite present values of aggregate
endowments
5This is only a necessary condition for the existence of bubble. This issue will be addressed in Sections
5.1.1 and 5.2.
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durable goods, collateralized assets and fiat money. They provide asset-pricing conditions
based on the existence of so-called deflators and non-pecuniary returns; then, they use them
to define bubbles. In the current paper, we focus on land and non-linear production functions.
Miao and Wang (2012, 2015) consider bubbles on the firm’s value with endogenous divi-
dends. They split this value in two parts: V (K) = QK +B, where K is the initial stock of
the firm, Q is the marginal Tobin’s Q (Q is endogenous) and B is the bubble. They interpret
Q as the fundamental value of firm. This approach, which is different from ours, cannot be
directly applied for valuation of land in our model because land is used by many agents while
a stock in Miao and Wang (2012, 2015) is issued by only one firm and stock dividends are
taken as given by other agents.
Becker et al. (2015), Bosi et al. (2017a) introduce the concept of physical capital bubble
in one- and two-sector models. They define the fundamental value of physical capital as the
sum of discounted values of capital returns (net of depreciation). As above, a physical capital
bubble exists if the equilibrium price of physical capital exceeds its fundamental value. In
our model, land, as input, looks like capital. The difference is that Becker et al. (2015), Bosi
et al. (2017a) consider a representative firm while, in our work, each agent can be viewed as
an entrepreneur.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the framework and
provides basic equilibrium properties. Sections 3 and 4 study the role of financial market
imperfections and land bubbles. Section 5 presents examples of bubbles in deterministic
economies with and without short-sales. Section 6 extends our analysis to the stochastic
case. Section 7 concludes. Technical proofs are gathered in the appendices.
2 Framework
We firstly consider an infinite-horizon general equilibrium model without uncertainty. A
model with uncertainty will be presented in Section 6. The time is discrete and runs from
date 0 to infinity. There is a finite number of agents and I = {1, 2, . . . ,m} denotes the set
of agents.
Consumption good. There is a single consumption good which is set to be the
nume´raire. At date t, agent i is endowed with ei,t units of consumption good, and chooses
to consume ci,t units of this good.
Land. We denote by L and qt the exogenous total supply of land and its price at date
t. At this date, agent i buys li,t units of land which is used to produce Fi(li,t) units of
consumption good and can be sold at a price qt+1 at date t + 1, where Fi is the production
function of agent i.
The financial market opens at the initial date. If agent i buys ai,t units of financial
asset at date t with price rt, she will receive ai,t units of consumption good at date t + 1.
Agents can also borrow in the credit market. However, if they do that, they are required to
hold land as collateral. The sense and the role of this constraint will be explained below.
Each household i takes the sequence of prices (q, r) := (qt, rt)
∞
t=0 as given and chooses
sequences of consumption, land, and asset volume (ci, li, ai) := (ci,t, li,t, ai,t)
+∞
t=0 in order to
maximizes her intertemporal utility
Pi(q, r) : max
(ci,li,ai)
+∞∑
t=0
βtiui(ci,t)
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subject to, for all t ≥ 0,
li,t ≥ 0 (2)
ci,t + qtli,t + rtai,t ≤ ei,t + qtli,t−1 + Fi(li,t−1) + ai,t−1 (3)
ai,t ≥ −fi
[
qt+1li,t + Fi(li,t)
]
(4)
where li,−1 > 0 is given and ai,−1 = 0 (no debt before the opening of financial markets).
Constraint (4) means that agent i can borrow an amount whose repayment does not
exceed an exogenous share of land income. The parameter fi is set by law and below 1.
Parameter fi can be viewed as the borrowing limit of agent i.
Constraint (4) can also be interpreted as a collateral constraint: agents can borrow but
they must own land as collateral. In case of default, lenders can seize the fraction fi of
agent i’s land income. Here, we assume fi ≤ 1 because there is lack of commitment (see
Quadrini (2011) for a review of this issue). By the way, our model is related to the literature
on general equilibrium with collateral constraints (Geanakoplos and Zame, 2002; Kiyotaki
and Moore, 1997; Kubler and Schmedders, 2003). However, it is different from Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) where the repayment does not exceed the revenue from reselling land. This
constraint corresponds to ai,t ≥ −qt+1li,t in our notations. Moreover, Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) look at the equilibrium properties around the steady state with rt is constant while
we will provide global analysis of intertemporal equilibria.
Our model is related to Liu et al. (2013) where land-price dynamics are investigated. Our
framework is also related to Farhi and Tirole (2012). However, we consider dynamic firms
in an infinite-horizon GE model while they focus on firms living for 3 periods in an OLG
model.
The economy, denoted by E , is characterized by a list of fundamentals
E := (ui, βi, ei, fi, li,−1, Fi).
Definition 1. Given the economy E, a list
(
q¯t, r¯t, (c¯i,t, l¯i,t, a¯i,t)
m
i=1
)+∞
t=0
is an intertemporal
equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) q¯t, r¯t ∈ (0,∞) ∀t ≥ 0.
(ii) Market clearing: for all t ≥ 0,
good:
m∑
i=1
c¯i,t =
m∑
i=1
(ei,t + Fi(l¯i,t−1)) (5)
land:
m∑
i=1
l¯i,t = L (6)
financial asset:
m∑
i=1
a¯i,t = 0. (7)
(iii) Agents’ optimality: for all i, (c¯i,t, l¯i,t, a¯i,t)
∞
t=0 is a solution of the problem Pi(q¯, r¯).
Notice that the financial asset in our framework is a short-lived asset with zero supply,
which is different from the long-lived asset bringing exogenous positive dividends in Lucas
(1978), Kocherlakota (1992), Le Van and Pham (2016). When production functions are not
stationary and given by Fi,t(x) = dtx, land in our model corresponds to the Lucas’ tree with
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exogenous dividends; in particular, when Fi = 0 ∀i, land is similar to fiat money as in Bewley
(1980) or pure bubble asset as in Tirole (1985).
In what follows, if we do not explicitly mention, we will work under the following as-
sumptions.
Assumption 1 (production functions). For all i, the function Fi is concave, continuously
differentiable, F ′i > 0 and Fi(0) = 0.
Notice that we consider both cases F ′i (0) =∞ and F ′i (0) <∞ (linear production functions
satisfy this condition).
Assumption 2 (endowments). li,−1 > 0, ai,−1 = 0 ∀i, and ei,t > 0 ∀i, ∀t.
Assumption 3 (borrowing limits). fi ∈ (0, 1] ∀i.
Assumption 4 (utility functions). For all i, the function ui is continuously differentiable,
concave, ui(0) = 0, u
′
i > 0, u
′
i(0) =∞.6
Assumption 5 (finite utility). For all i,
∞∑
t=0
βtiui(Wt) <∞, where Wt :=
m∑
i=1
(
ei,t + Fi(L)
)
. (8)
Under assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, there exists an intertemporal equilibrium. A proof for
this result can be found in our working paper version (Bosi et al., 2017b). Notice that
in this proof, we allow for non-stationary production functions. However, in this paper
(except Section 5 and Section 6), we assume that the technology is stationary for the sake
of notational simplicity.
2.1 Borrowing constraints and transversality conditions
We provide the following fundamental result: a tractable necessary and sufficient condition
to check whether a sequence is an intertemporal equilibrium or not.
Proposition 1.
1. Let
(
q, r, (ci, li, ai)
m
i=1
)
be an equilibrium. There exists a positive sequence of multipliers
(λi,t, ηi,t, µi,t+1) such that
FOCs: βtiu
′
i(ci,t) = λi,t (9)
rtλi,t = (λi,t+1 + µi,t+1) (10)
λi,tqt = (λi,t+1 + fiµi,t+1)(qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)) + ηi,t (11)
ηi,tli,t = 0 (12)
µi,t+1
(
ai,t + fi
[
qt+1li,t + Fi(li,t)
])
= 0 (13)
Transversality condition: lim
t→∞
λi,t(qtli,t + rtai,t) = 0 (14)
Moreover, we have, for any i,
∞ >
∞∑
t=0
λi,tci,t = λi,0
(
Fi(li,−1) + q0li,−1
)
+
∞∑
t=0
λi,tei,t
+
∞∑
t=1
λi,t
(
1 + fi
µi,t
λi,t
)(
Fi(li,t−1)− li,t−1F ′i (li,t−1)
)
(15)
6In the proof of the existence of equilibrium, we do not require u′i(0) = ∞. This condition is to ensure
that ci,t > 0 for any t, which is used in the rest of the paper.
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2. If the sequences (q, r, (ci, li, ai)i) and (λi, ηi, µi) satisfy
(a) ci,t, li,t, λi,t, ηi,t, µi,t+1 ≥ 0; qt, rt > 0 for any t;
(b) condition (3) is binding and conditions (2), (4), (5), (6), (7) hold for any t;
(c) conditions (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14) hold for any t;
(d)
∑∞
t=0 β
t
iui(ci,t) <∞;
then (q, r, (ci, li, ai)i) is an intertemporal equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The challenge and key point of Proposition 1 is the necessity of transversality conditions
(14). To prove this, we develop the method in Kamihigashi (2002). Recall that Kamihigashi
(2002) only considers positive allocations while asset volume ai,t may be negative in our
model. The detailed proof of this result is presented in Appendix A.
According to (10), we have rtλi,t ≥ λi,t+1 ∀i. Since fi > 0 ∀i, it is easy to see that
there exists an agent i whose borrowing constraint (4) is not binding. Thus µi,t+1 = 0 which
implies that rtλi,t = λi,t+1. As a result, we obtain the following result:
Lemma 1. We have
rt = max
i∈{1,...,m}
βiu
′
i(ci,t+1)
u′i(ci,t)
(16)
We define the discount factor γt+1 (γi,t+1) of the economy (agent i) from date t to date
t+ 1, and the discount factor Qt (Qi,t) of the economy (agent i) from the initial date to date
t as follows
γt+1 := max
i∈{1,...,m}
βiu
′
i(ci,t+1)
u′i(ci,t)
, Q0 := 1, Qt := γ1 . . . γt = r0 . . . rt−1
γi,t+1 :=
βiu
′
i(ci,t+1)
u′i(ci,t)
, Qi,0 := 1, Qi,t := γi,1 · · · γi,t = β
t
iu
′
i(ci,t)
u′i(ci,0)
Note that γi,t ≤ γt for any i and t. According to Alvarez and Jermann (2000), Qt can be
interpreted as the price of one unit of aggregate good in date t in units of consumption good
in date 0. We rewrite constraint (4) as
Qt+1ai,t ≥ −fiQt+1
[
qt+1li,t + Fi(li,t)
]
According to definition of (Qt) and Lemma 1, we see that Qt+1 = Qtrt. Therefore, borrowing
constraint (4) is equivalent to
Qtrtai,t ≥ −fiQt+1
[
qt+1li,t + Fi(li,t)
]
Corollary 1 (fluctuation of borrowing constraints). At equilibrium, we have:
1. For each i, there are only two cases:
(a) lim
t→∞
(
Qtrtai,t + fiQt+1
(
qt+1li,t + Fi(li,t)
))
does not exist;
(b) lim
t→∞
(
Qtrtai,t + fiQt+1
(
qt+1li,t + Fi(li,t)
))
= 0.
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2. (transversality condition, version 2) We have, for all i,
lim inf
t→∞
(
Qtrtai,t + fiQt+1
(
qt+1li,t + Fi(li,t)
))
= 0 (17)
Proof. See Appendix A.
We observe that there are two kinds of transversality conditions. The first one is (14)
which is determined by the individual discount factor βtiu
′
i(ci,t)/u
′
i(ci,0). It characterizes the
optimality of agent i’s allocations. The second one is (17) based on the economy discount
factor Qt and it clarifies the role of borrowing constraints.
Remark 1. All the results in this section apply also to non-stationary production functions.
3 The role of the financial market
For each t ≥ 1, we introduce two productive bounds:
dt := min
i∈{1,...,m}
F ′i (li,t−1), d¯t := max
i∈{1,...,m}
F ′i (li,t−1).
We have the following result showing the relationship among land prices, marginal pro-
ductivities, interest rates and borrowing limits.
Lemma 2. The relative price of land is governed by the following inequalities:
γt+1
(
qt+1 + dt+1) ≤ qt ≤ γt+1
(
qt+1 + d¯t+1) (18)
fiγt+1(qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
) ≤ qt (19)
for any i and t.
Proof. See Appendix B.
According to (18), we introduce the concept of land dividends (or added-value of land,
or land yields).
Definition 2 (dividends of land). The dividends of land (dt)t is defined by the following
no-arbitrage condition
qt = γt+1
(
qt+1 + dt+1) (20)
Interpretation. Once we buy land, we will be able to resell it and expect to receive an
amount. This amount is exactly the dividend of land defined by (20). Equation (20) says
that what we pay to buy 1 unit of land at date t is equal to what we will receive by reselling
1 unit of land plus the dividend of land (in terms of consumption good). When technologies
are linear and identical (Fi(X) = dX for any i), we have dt = d for any t, and hence we
recover the Lucas’ tree. In our general setup, (18) implies that land dividend dt is greater
than the lowest marginal productivity dt but less than the highest one d¯t.
In our model, land has a threefold structure: after buying land at date t, agents (1) resell
it at date t + 1, (2) use it as collateral in order to borrow from financial markets and (3)
receive an amount of consumption good from their production process. Definition 2 states
that dividends are endogenous and capture the roles (2) and (3) of land. In fact, because
land is resold and gives dividends at each date, (20) can be interpreted as an asset-pricing
or a no-arbitrage condition.
We point out some interesting properties of land dividends.
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Lemma 3 (fair financial system). dt+1 = d¯t+1 if fi = 1 ∀i or (4) is not binding for any i.
Proof. See Appendix B.
We can interpret fi = 1 as a full access to credit market for agent i. Lemma 3 points out
that the land dividend equals the highest marginal productivity if either anyone may fully
enter the credit market or borrowing constraints of any agent are not binding.
This following result shows that dividends equal the lowest marginal productivities if
every agent buys land.
Proposition 2. Focus on date t and assume li,t−1 > 0 ∀i. In this case, dt = dt.
Proof. See Appendix B.
We highlight some consequences of Lemma 3 and Proposition 2.
Corollary 2. 1. If F ′i (0) = +∞ ∀i, then dt = dt ∀t.
2. (equal marginal productivities.) If µi,t = fiµi,t
7 and li,t−1 > 0, then F ′i (li,t−1) = dt ∀i.
3. If fi = 1 and F
′
i (0) =∞ for any i, then dt = F ′i (li,t−1) ∀i, ∀t.
3.1 Who buys land? Who needs credits?
In this section, we point out conditions under which agents become producers and/or bor-
rowers. First, land demand depends on agents’ productivity.
Proposition 3. If li,t > 0, then F
′
i (li,t) ≥ dt+1.
If F ′i (li,t) > dt+1, then borrowing constraint (4) of agent i is binding.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The first statement means that if an agent buys land, its marginal productivity must
be greater than land dividends. The second one shows that if an agent has a marginal
productivity which is strictly greater than land dividend, she will borrow until her borrowing
constraints become binding. In other words, this agent needs credit.
The next result suggests that agents with a low productivity do not buy land to produce.
Proposition 4. Focus on agent i and assume that there exists an agent j such that fj = 1
and F ′i (0) < F
′
j(L). Then we have li,t = 0 ∀t.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Notice that Proposition 4 holds whatever the form of utility functions and the size of the
discount rate βi.
We can interpret fj = 1 as a full access of agent j to credit market. In this case, any
agent i with low productivity (in the sense that F ′i (0) < F
′
j(L)) never produces. Proposition
4 is in line with Proposition 1 in Le Van and Pham (2016) where they prove that nobody
invests in the productive sector if the productivity of this sector is too low.
Agents can be reinterpreted as countries. In this case, our economy works as a world
economy with free trade. Each country i is endowed with li,0 units of land. When the trade
is fully free and the international financial market is good enough (in the sense that fi = 1
for any i), countries with a lower productivity never produce and land in these countries will
be held by the countries with the highest productivity.
7This condition is satisfied if f i = 1 or ai,t−1 > −fi
[
qtli,t−1 + Fi(li,t−1)
]
.
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Remark 2. When there is lack of commitment (due to financial or political frictions) char-
acterized by fj < 1, the analysis becomes more complex. In Section 5.1.1, we will present
an example where there are two agents: A and B with fA = 0 (agent A is prevented from
borrowing) with linear technologies. In this example, at date 2t+ 1, the productivity of agent
A is higher than that of agent B, but agent B may produce at date 2t+ 1.
3.2 A particular case: a steady state analysis
In this section, we assume that agents have no endowments, that is ei,t = 0 ∀i, ∀t. For
simplicity, we also assume that there are two agents, say i and j, with different rates of time
preference: βi < βj.
We give an analysis at the steady state. Recall that when endowments are not stationary,
the existence of steady state may not hold.
Lemma 4. Consider two agents i and j with βi < βj. If ei,t = 0 ∀i, ∀t, and Fi(li) = Ailαi
∀t, where α ∈ (0, 1), then there is a unique steady state:
r = βj (21)
q
1
1−αL =
( αAi
1
βi+fi(βj−βi) − 1
) 1
1−α
+
( αAj
1
βj
− 1
) 1
1−α
(22)
li =
( αAi
1
βi+fi(βj−βi) − 1
1
q
) 1
1−α
, lj = L− li (23)
ai + fi
[
qli + Fi(li)
]
= 0, ai + aj = 0. (24)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Who will own land in the long run?
Cobb-Douglas technologies imply li, lj > 0. Each agent holds a strictly positive amount of
land to produce themselves. In this respect, our model differs from Becker and Mitra (2012)
where the most patient agent holds the entire stock of capital in the long run. The difference
rests on two reasons.
First, in Becker and Mitra (2012), the firm is unique and consumers do not produce.
In our model, any agent produces with her own technology and can be viewed as a credit-
constrained entrepreneur.
Second, in Becker and Mitra (2012), returns on capital are determined by the marginal
productivity of their representative firm. In our framework, land dividends are interpreted
as land returns and determined by no-arbitrage condition (20).
Corollary 3 (role of borrowing limit fi). Under conditions in Lemma 4, we have:
1. Price: The relative price of land q increases in fi.
2. Output: The long-run quantity of fruits, i.e., Y := Fi(li) + Fj(lj) is increasing in the
borrowing limit fi.
The intuition of point 1 is that when fi increases, agent i can borrow more and, then,
land demand increases in turn raising the price of land at the end.
The point 2 is also intuitive: the higher the level of fi, the more the quantity the agent
with the highest productivity can borrow, and, finally, the more the output produced.
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4 Land bubbles
Combining Qt+1 = γt+1Qt with (20), we get
Qtqt = Qt+1
(
qt+1 + dt+1
)
(25)
and, so,
q0 = γ1(q1 + d1) = Q1d1 +Q1q1 = Q1d1 +Q1γ2(q2 + d2) = Q1d1 +Q2d2 +Q2q2
= . . . =
T∑
t=1
Qtdt +QT qT∀T ≥ 1. (26)
This leads the following definition.
Definition 3 (bubble). The fundamental value of land is defined by FV0 :=
∑∞
t=1Qtdt. We
say that a land bubble exists if the market price of land (in term of consumption good) exceeds
its fundamental value: q0 > FV0.
As seen above, land dividends capture a twofold role of land: land is used to produce a
consumption good and, as collateral, to borrow. The fundamental value of land reflects the
value of these roles.
As in Montrucchio (2004), Le Van and Pham (2014), some equivalences hold.
Proposition 5 (Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of bubbles). A land
bubble exists (i.e., lim
t→∞
Qtqt > 0) if and only if
∑∞
t=1 (dt/qt) < +∞.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Note that this result only depends on the no-arbitrage condition (25). Proposition 5
holds for any form of technologies, even non-stationary.
Since we are assuming that technologies are stationary, we have dt ≥ mini F ′i (li,t−1) ≥
mini F
′
i (L) > 0 ∀t. This leads the following result.
Corollary 4. If a land bubble exists, then
∑∞
t=1 (1/qt) < +∞.
This explains why the existence of land bubble implies that real land prices tend to in-
finity. Notice, however, that this fact only holds in the case of stationary technology. In
Section 5.1.1, this issue will be readdressed.
Interest rates, asset prices and bubbles. According to (26), we have
∑∞
t=1Qtdt ≤ q0 <
∞ and, also, dt ≥ mini F ′i (li,t−1) ≥ mini F ′i (L) > 0 ∀t. Eventually, we get
∑∞
t=1Qt <∞.
We introduce the real interest rate of the economy ρt at date t as follows: γt = 1/ (1 + ρt).
We notice that ρt may be negative. The condition
∑∞
t=1Qt <∞ writes explicitly
∞∑
t=0
1
t∏
s=1
(1 + ρs)
<∞
and we can reinterpret it by saying that the real interest rates are not ”too low”. We also
observe that there exists a sequence of dates (tn)n such that ρtn > 0 for all n.
According to Proposition 5, a land bubble exists if and only if lim
t→∞
1∏t
s=1(1 + ρs)
qt > 0.
This condition implies in turn lim
t→∞
qt+1
qt
1
1 + ρt+1
= 1. Hence, in the long run, if a land bubble
exists, the rate of growth of land prices is equal to the gross interest rate.
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4.1 No-bubble results
Proposition 6. If Qt/Qi,t is uniformly bounded from above for all i, then there is no bubble.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Write γi,t = 1/ (1 + ρi,t), where ρi,t is interpreted as the the real expected interest rate
of agent i at date t. As above, this interest rate may be negative. According to Proposition
6, if a bubble exists, there is an agent i such that her expected interest rates are high with
respect to those of the economy in the following sense:
T∏
s=1
1 + ρi,t
1 + ρt
T→∞−−−→∞
Let us point out some consequences of Proposition 6.
Corollary 5. If there exists T > 0 such that µi,t = 0 ∀i, ∀t ≥ T , then there is no land bubble.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The intuition of this result is that when µi,t = 0 ∀i, ∀t ≥ T , the individual discount factors
coincide with the discount factors of the economy. In this case, the no-bubble condition turns
out to be equivalent to the no-Ponzi scheme. Since the transversality conditions are satisfied,
the no-bubble condition holds as well.
Corollary 5 implies that if the borrowing constraints of any agent are not binding, then,
there is no bubble. The following corollary clarifies it in other words.
Corollary 6 (bubble existence and borrowing constraints). If a land bubble exists, there
exist an agent i and an infinite sequence of dates (tn)n such that the borrowing constraints
of agent i are binding at each date tn, that is, for all tn,
ai,tn−1 = −fi
[
qtnli,tn−1 + Fi(li,tn−1)
]
Remark 3. The binding of borrowing constraints is only a necessary condition for the exis-
tence of bubble. Sections 5.1.1 and 5.2 provide some examples where borrowing constraints
of any agent are frequently binding but bubble may not exist.
The relationship between the existence of bubble and borrowing constraints is questioned
in Kocherlakota (1992). He considers borrowing constraints: xi,t ≥ x, where xi,t is the
asset quantity held by agent i at date t and x ≤ 0 is an exogenous bound. He claims that
lim inft→∞(xi,t − x) = 0 and interprets that borrowing constraints of agent i are frequently
binding. He did not proved that xi,t − x = 0 frequently.
We define the aggregate output of the economy at date t as Yt :=
∑m
i=1 [ei,t + Fi(li,t−1)]
and the present value of the aggregate output as
∑∞
t=0QtYt.
The main result of the section rests on the following list of four lemmas whose proofs are
gathered in Appendix C.
Lemma 5. If supi,t ei,t <∞ and technologies are stationary, the present value of the aggre-
gate output is finite.
Lemma 6. Assume that supi,t ei,t <∞ and technologies be stationary. Given an equilibrium,
we obtain that Qt
(
li,tqt + rtai,t
)
is uniformly bounded from below and from above as well.
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Lemma 7. Let supi,t ei,t < ∞ and technologies be stationary. Given an equilibrium, the
following limits exist:
lim
t→∞
Qt
(
qtli,t + rtai,t
)
= lim
t→∞
(
Qtqtli,t−1 +Qtai,t−1
) ∀i. (27)
Lemma 8. Let supi,t ei,t <∞ and technologies be stationary. Given an equilibrium, if there
exists T such that
fi
(
qt +
Fi(li,t−1)
li,t−1
)
li,t−1 ≥ (qt + dt)li,t−1 ∀t ≥ T, (28)
then limt→∞Qt
(
qtli,t + rtai,t
) ≤ 0.
Let us now state the main result of this section.
Proposition 7. Assume that supi,t ei,t < ∞ and fi = 1 ∀i. We also assume that all tech-
nologies be stationary and not zero. Then, there is no land bubble at equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix C.
This proposition points out that there is no land bubble at equilibrium when the financial
system is good enough (in the sense that fi = 1 ∀i), exogenous endowments are bounded
from above and the technology is stationary.
Proposition 7 suggests that land bubbles only appear when TFP of land technologies
tends to zero or/and endowments grow without bound or/and agents cannot easily enter the
financial market (fi < 1). In Section 5, we will present some examples of bubbles, where
these conditions are violated.
Proposition 7 is in line with the results in Kocherlakota (1992), Santos and Woodford
(1997), Huang and Werner (2000) and Le Van and Pham (2014), where they prove that
bubbles are ruled out if the present value of aggregate endowments is finite. Indeed, the
asset in Kocherlakota (1992) is a particular case of land in our model when Fi,t(X) = ξtX
∀i, ∀X. Proposition 7 also shows that land bubbles are ruled out in Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997).
Remark 4. 1. Proposition 7 still holds for any technology in the form Ai,tFi where Ai,t
is bounded away from zero for any i.
2. Interestingly, although we are considering the utility function
∑
t β
t
iui(ci,t), our proof of
Proposition 7 still works in more general cases (for example, when the utility function
takes the form
∑
t ui,t(ci,t)).
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4.2 Alternative concepts: individual and strong bubbles
According to (11), we have
qt =
λi,t+1 + fiµi,t+1
λi,t
(qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)) +
ηi,t
λi,t
=
λi,t+1
λi,t
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t) +
ηi,t
λi,t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Production return
+
fiµi,t+1
λi,t+1
(qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Collateral return
)
)
8It should be noticed that our method here is no longer suitable for stochastic economies with incomplete
markets. This issue will be addressed in Section 6.2.2.
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We rewrite
qt = γi,t+1
(
qt+1 + di,t+1
)
(29)
and call di,t+1 the individual dividend of agent i at date t+1. Here di,t+1 includes two terms.
The first one is Xi,t+1 := F
′
i (li,t) +
ηi,t
λi,t+1
which represents the return from the production
process.9 The second term
fiµi,t+1
λi,t+1
(qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t) can be interpreted as a collateral return.
Note that the collateral return is equal to zero if fi = 0 or µi,t+1 = 0 (happen if borrowing
constraint is not binding).
The asset-pricing equation (29) shows the way agent i evaluates the price of land. With
the individual discount factor γi,t+1, once agent i buys land, she will be able to resell land
at a price qt+1 and she will expect to receive di,t+1 units of consumption good as dividends.
Since the individual discount factor γi,t+1 is less than that of economy γt+1, the individual
dividend di,t+1 expected by agent i exceeds the dividend dt+1 of the economy.
Using (29) and adopting the same argument in (26), we find that, for all T ≥ 1,
q0 =
T∑
t=1
Qi,tdi,t +Qi,T qT
Definition 4 (individual bubble). 1. FVi :=
∑∞
t=1Qi,tdi,t is the i-fundamental value of
land. We say that a i-land bubble exists if q0 >
∑∞
t=1 Qi,tdi,t.
2. A strong bubble exists if the asset price exceeds any individual value of land, that is
q0 > maxi FVi ∀i.
The concept of i−bubble is closely related to bubbles of durable goods and collateralized
assets in Araujo et al. (2011) or bubble of fiat money in Pascoa et al. (2011). Given an
equilibrium, Araujo et al. (2011) provide asset-pricing conditions (Corollary 1, page 263)
based on the existence of what they call deflators and non-pecuniary returns which are
not necessarily unique. Then, they define bubble associated to each deflators and non-
pecuniary returns. In our framework, for each equilibrium, we give closed formulas for
two types of deflators (we call γt and γi,t discount factor and individual discount factor
respectively). Unlike Araujo et al. (2011), the technology in our paper may be non-linear
and non-stationary.
By applying the same argument in Proposition 5, we obtain some equivalences.
Proposition 8. An i-land bubble exists (i.e., lim
t→∞
Qi,tqt > 0) if and only if
∞∑
t=1
(di,t/qt) < +∞.
Another added-value of our paper (comparing with Araujo et al. (2011), Pascoa et al.
(2011)) is to study the connection between the concepts of bubble and i-bubble. This is
showed in the following result.
Proposition 9. We have that:
1. FV0 ≤ FVi ≤ q0 ∀i. By consequence, if an i-land bubble exists for some agent i, then
a land bubble exists.
2. There is an agent i such that her i-bubble is ruled out. Consequently, there is no strong
land bubble, that is q0 = maxi FVi.
9Note that Xi,t+1li,t = F
′
i (li,t)li,t.
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3. If FV0 = FVi ∀i, then FV0 = FVi = q0 ∀i, that is, there is no room for bubble nor
i-bubble.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Comments and discussions. FV0 ≤ FVi ≤ q0 follows from the definitions of bubble
and i-bubble. The intuition is that, since any agent expects a higher interest rate than that of
the economy, the individual value of land expected by any agent will exceed the fundamental
value of land. Nevertheless, the converse of point 1 may not be true. In Section 5.1.1, we
present an example where i-bubble does not exist for all i while land bubble may arise.
Points 2 shows that there is an agent whose expected value of land equals its equilibrium
price. Point 3 is more intuitive and complements point 2: when any individual value of land
coincides with that of economy, both land and individual bubbles are ruled out. However,
when any individual value of land is identical but different from the fundamental value of
land, we do not know whether land bubbles are ruled out.10
Our concept of strong bubble is related to the notion of speculative bubble in Werner
(2014). He considers an asset bringing exogenous dividends in a model with ambiguity.
Werner (2014) defines the asset fundamental value under the beliefs of agent i as the sum of
discounted expected future dividends under her beliefs. He then says that speculative bubble
exists if the asset price is strictly higher than any agent’s fundamental value. The readers
may ask why strong bubbles are ruled out while speculative bubbles in Werner (2014) may
exist. It is hard to compare these two results since the two concepts of bubbles are defined
in two different settings (with and without ambiguity).
Remark 5. It should be noticed that Proposition 9 still holds in more general cases (for
example, when the utility function is
∑
t ui,t(ci,t)).
5 Examples of bubbles
In this section, we contribute to the literature of rational bubbles by providing some examples
where bubbles appear in deterministic economies even short-sales are allowed.11 Notice that
dividends are endogenous determined and may be strictly positive.
5.1 Land bubbles without financial market
Focus on the case where there is no financial market. In this section, we allow for non-
stationary production functions. Let us rewrite agents’ program. The household i takes the
sequence of land prices (q) = (qt)
∞
t=0 as given and chooses sequences of consumption and land
(ci, li) := (ci,t, li,t)
+∞
t=0 in order to maximize her intertemporal utility
Pi(q) : max
+∞∑
t=0
βtiui(ci,t)
subject to, for all t ≥ 0, : li,t ≥ 0, ci,t + qtli,t ≤ ei,t + qtli,t−1 + Fi,t(li,t−1), (30)
where li,−1 > 0 is given.
10See observation ”1. bubble vs i-bubble” in Section 5.1.1.
11Araujo et al. (2011) provide some examples of equilibria with bubbles in models where the utility
functions take the form
∑
t≥0
ζi,tu(ci,t) + i inft≥0 ui(ci,t). The parameter i plays the key role on the existence
of bubbles.
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Under a linear technology (Fi,t(x) = ξtx ∀i), the land structure becomes the same asset
structure as in Kocherlakota (1992), and Huang and Werner (2000). If Fi = 0 ∀i, land
becomes a pure bubble as in Tirole (1985).
Definition 5. A list
(
q¯t, (c¯i,t, l¯i,t)
m
i=1
)+∞
t=0
is an equilibrium of the economy without financial
market if the following conditions hold.
(i) q¯t ∈ (0,∞) ∀t ≥ 0.
(ii) Market clearing: for all t ≥ 0,
m∑
i=1
c¯i,t =
m∑
i=1
(ei,t + Fi,t(l¯i,t−1)),
m∑
i=1
l¯i,t = L.
(iii) Agents’ optimality: for all i, (c¯i,t, l¯i,t)
∞
t=0 is a solution of the problem Pi(q¯).
Remark 6. By applying Proposition 1 and Lemma 9 (Appendix D), we can check that an
equilibrium for the economy without financial market is a part of an equilibrium for the
economy E with fi = 0 ∀i.
Let (q, (ci, li)
m
i=1) be an equilibrium. Denoting by λi,t and µi,t the multipliers associated
to the budget constraint (30) of agent i and to the borrowing constraint li,t ≥ 0, we obtain
the following FOCs:
βtiu
′
i(ci,t) = λi,t
λi,tqt = λi,t+1(qt+1 + F
′
i,t+1(li,t)) + ηi,t, ηi,tli,t = 0.
As above, we introduce the dividends of land: qt = γt+1
(
qt+1 + dt+1), where γt+1 is the
discount factor of the economy from date t to date t+ 1: γt+1 := max
i∈{1,...,m}
βiu
′
i(ci,t+1)
u′i(ci,t)
.
We define the discount factor of the economy from initial date to date t as follows:
Q0 := 1 and Qt :=
∏t
s=1 γs for any t ≥ 1. Then, the fundamental value of the land is defined
by FV0 :=
∑∞
t=1 Qtdt. We say that a land bubble exists if q0 > FV0.
5.1.1 Examples of land bubbles
We now construct equilibria with bubbles.
The economy’s fundamentals. Assume that there are two agents (A and B) with a
common utility function uA(x) = uB(x) = ln(x) but different non-stationary technologies
FA,t(X) = AtX,FB,t(X) = BtX. For the sake of simplicity, we normalize the supply of land
to one: L = 1. We assume that eA,2t = eB,2t+1 = 0 ∀t.
We need the following conditions to ensure the FOCs and identify the sequence of discount
factors of the economy (γt).
βA(
βBeB,2t
1 + βB
+ A2t)(
βAeA,2t+1
1 + βA
+ A2t+1) ≤ βB eB,2t
1 + βB
eA,2t+1
1 + βA
(31)
βB(
βAeA,2t−1
1 + βA
+B2t−1)(
βBeB,2t
1 + β
+B2t) ≤ βA eB,2t
1 + βB
eA,2t−1
1 + βA
(32)
βA(
βBeB,2t
1 + βB
+ A2t)(
βAeA,2t+1
1 + βA
+B2t+1) ≤ βB eB,2t
1 + βB
eA,2t+1
1 + βA
(33)
βB(
βAeA,2t−1
1 + βA
+B2t−1)(
βBeB,2t
1 + β
+ A2t) ≤ βA eB,2t
1 + βB
eA,2t−1
1 + βA
. (34)
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These conditions are not too demanding and are satisfied if, for instance, βA = βB = β,
max(A2t, B2t) <
(1− β)eB,2t
1 + β
and max(A2t+1, B2t+1) <
(1− β)eA,2t+1
1 + β
∀t.
Equilibrium. In Appendix D, we compute the equilibrium allocations.
lA,2t−1 = L, lA,2t = 0, lB,2t−1 = 0, lB,2t = L (35)
cA,2t = q2tL+ A2tL, cB,2t + q2tL = eB,2t (36)
cA,2t+1 + q2t+1L = eA,2t+1, cB,2t+1 = q2t+1L+B2t+1L (37)
as well the equilibrium prices
q2t =
βB
1 + βB
eB,2t and q2t+1 =
βA
1 + βA
eA,2t+1 ∀t ≥ 0.
We find also the discount factors and the land dividends
γ2t =
βAu
′
A(cA,2t)
u′A(cA,2t−1)
and γ2t+1 =
βBu
′
B(cB,2t+1)
u′B(cB,2t)
∀t ≥ 0 (38)
d2t = A2t and d2t+1 = B2t+1 ∀t ≥ 0. (39)
According to Proposition 5, a land bubble exists if and only if
∑∞
t=0 dt/qt <∞, i.e.,
∞∑
t=0
A2t
eB,2t
+
∞∑
t=0
B2t+1
eA,2t+1
<∞
Intuition. This condition may be interpreted that land dividends are low with respect
to endowments. This implies that the existence of bubble requires low dividends. Let us
explain the intuition. In the odd periods (2t+1), agent B has no endowments. She wants to
smooth consumption over time according to her logarithm utility (which satisfies the Inada
conditions), but she cannot transfer her wealth from future to this date.12 By consequence,
she accepts to buy land at a higher price: q2t ≥ eB,2tβB/ (1 + βB), independently on agents’
productivity. A lower productivity implies lower dividends and a lower fundamental value of
land. As long as dividends tend to zero, the land price remains higher than this fundamental
value.
We point our some particular cases of our example.
Example 1 (land bubble with endowment growth). Consider our example and assume that
At = Bt = A ∀t. Then a land bubble exists if and only if
∞∑
t=0
1
eB,2t
+
∞∑
t=0
1
eA,2t+1
<∞
Example 1 illustrates Proposition 7. Thus, under a common stationary production func-
tion and fi = 0 ∀i, land bubbles may appear if endowments tend to infinity. In this example,
we see that a land bubble arises if and only if
∞∑
t=1
1/qt < ∞. By the way, this result also
illustrates Corollary 4.
Example 2 (land bubble with collapsing land technologies). Reconsider our example. If
eA,2t+1 = eB,2t = e > 0 ∀t, then a land bubble emerges if and only if
∑∞
t=0(A2t +B2t+1) <∞.
12Because she is prevented from borrowing.
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This result is also related to Bosi et al. (2017a) where they show that bubbles in aggregate
good arise if the sum of capital returns is finite.
Some interesting remarks deserve mention.
1. Bubble vs i-bubble. Since limt→∞ βtiu
′
i(ci,t)qt = 0 for i = A,B, there does not
exist no i-bubble for i = A,B. However, a land bubble may occur. In this case,
any individual value of land is identical and equal to the equilibrium price but it may
exceed the fundamental value of land.
2. i-bubble and borrowing constraints. In the above example, borrowing constraints
of both agents are binding at infinitely many dates while every individual bubbles are
ruled out and land bubbles may or may not appear. This shows that the values of
(individual) bubbles are not the shadow prices of binding borrowing constraints.
3. Pure bubble (or fiat money). We consider a particular case: If At = Bt = 0 ∀t.
In this case, the fundamental value of land is zero and an equilibrium is bubbly if the
prices of land are strictly positive in any period (qt > 0 ∀t). This bubble is called pure
bubble (Tirole, 1985). Our example shows that equilibria with pure bubble may exist
in infinite-horizon general equilibrium models.
In this case, the land in our model can be interpreted as fiat money in Bewley (1980),
Santos and Woodford (1997), Pascoa et al. (2011) where they provide some examples
where the fiat money price is strictly positive. Our contribution concerns the existence
of bubble of assets with positive and endogenous dividends.
4. Land bubbles vs monotonicity of prices. Corollary 4 points out that, under
stationary technologies, the existence of land bubble entails the divergence of land
prices to infinity. However, in our example with non-stationary technologies, the land
prices are given by
q2t =
βB
1 + βB
eB,2t and q2t+1 =
βA
1 + βA
eA,2t+1
and we see that land prices may either increase or decrease or fluctuate over time
whenever bubbles exist. Our result generalizes that of Weil (1990) where he gives
an example of bubble with decreasing asset prices. His model is a particular case of
ours when land gives no longer fruits from some date on: there exists T such that
At = Bt = 0 ∀t ≥ T .
5. Do the most productive agents produce? In the above examples, although agents
have linear production functions, these functions are different.
There is a case where the productivity of agent A is higher than that of agent B, i.e.,
A2t+1 > B2t+1, but agent A does not produce at date 2t + 1 while agent B produce
at this date. For two reasons: (1) agents are prevented from borrowing, (2) agents’
endowments change over time. Although A has a higher productivity at date 2t + 1,
she has also a higher endowment at this date, but no endowment at date 2t. So, she
may not need to buy land at date 2t to produce and transfer wealth from date 2t to
date 2t + 1. Instead, she sells land at date 2t to buy and consume consumption good
at date 2t. Therefore, agent A may not produce at date 2t+ 1 even A2t+1 > B2t+1.
Using similar methods, we may construct other examples of bubbles with non-linear
production functions, for example Fi,t(x) = Ai,tln(1 + x) where Ai,t ≥ 0. Notice that Bosi
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et al. (2018) consider an OLG model with non-linear production functions, including Cobb-
Douglas technology, and provide some examples of bubbles, where equilibrium indeterminacy
may arise.
5.1.2 Example of individual land bubbles
The economy’s fundamentals. Consider the example in Section 5.1.1. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that βA = βB =: β.
We add the third agent: agent D. The utility, the rate of time preference, and the
technologies of agent D are: uD(c) = ln(c), βD = β, FD,t(L) = DtL.
The endowments (eD,t)t and productivities (Dt) of agents D are defined by
βeD,t
eD,t+1
=
qt
qt+1 +Dt+1
= γt+1
where (γt) is determined as in Section 5.1.1. We see that such sequences (eD,t)t and (Dt)
exist. Indeed, for example, we choose Dt = dt where dt is determined as in (39). Then, we
choose (eD,t)t such that βeD,t = γt+1eD,t+1.
Equilibrium: Prices and allocations of agents A and B are as in Section 5.1.1. The allo-
cations of agent D are cD,t = eD,t and lD,t = 0 ∀t. By using the same argument in Section
5.1.1, it is easy to verify that this system of prices and allocations constitutes an equilibrium.
We observe that agent D does not trade and γD,t = βeD,t−1/eD,t = γt ∀t. By consequence,
limt→∞QD,tqt = limt→∞Qtqt > 0. There is a D - bubble, i.e. the equilibrium price of land
is strictly higher than the individual value of land with respect to agent D.
5.2 Land bubbles with short-sales
We now provide examples of bubbles when short-sales are allowed. These new examples
particularly contribute to the novelty of our paper.
The economy’s fundamentals. Assume that there are two agents (A and B) with a
common utility function uA(x) = uB(x) = ln(x) but different non-stationary technologies:
FA,t(X) = AtX,FB,t(X) = BtX with
B2t ≥ A2t, A2t+1 ≥ B2t+1 ∀t.
The supply of land is L = 1. Borrowing limits are fA = fB = 1. For simplicity, we assume
that βA = βB = β ∈ (0, 1). Applying Proposition 1 allows us obtain the following result.
Example 3 (land bubbles with short-sales). Let endowments be given by13
eB,2t−1 = eA,2t = 0 ∀t ≥ 1
eB,2teA,2t+1
(1 + β)2
>
( β
1 + β
eB,2t +B2t
)( β
1 + β
eA,2t+1 + A2t+1
)
∀t ≥ 0
eB,2teA,2t−1
(1 + β)2
>
( β
1 + β
eB,2t +B2t
)( β
1 + β
eA,2t−1 + A2t−1
)
∀t ≥ 1.
Equilibrium prices are determined as follows:
q0 = β(eB,0 +B0), q2t =
β
1 + β
eB,2t ∀t ≥ 0, q2t−1 = β
1 + β
eA,2t−1 ∀t ≥ 1,
1
r2t−1
=
q2t +B2t
q2t−1
∀t ≥ 1, 1
r2t−2
=
q2t−1 + A2t−1
q2t−2
∀t ≥ 1.
13These conditions are similar to (31, 32, 33, 34) in our example of bubble in models without short-sales.
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Allocations are determined by
(lA,2t−1, lB,2t−1) = (0, 1), (lA,2t, lB,2t) = (1, 0) (40)
aA,2t−1 = q2t +B2t = −aB,2t−1, aB,2t = q2t+1 + A2t+1 = −aA,2t ∀t ≥ 1. (41)
Dividends are calculated by
d2t = B2t and d2t+1 = A2t+1 ∀t ≥ 0. (42)
According to Proposition 5, a land bubble exists if and only if
∞∑
t=1
B2t
eB,2t
+
∞∑
t=0
A2t+1
eA,2t+1
<∞. (43)
As in economies without-short sales, a bubble may occur if endowments growth without bound
and/or TFP tends to zero.
The intuition of our example: Look at the economy at date 2t. Agent B knows that
she will not have endowment at date 2t+ 1: eB,2t+1 = 0, and hence she wants to transfer her
wealth from date 2t to date 2t+ 1 (she saves at date 2t). Therefore, she may accept to buy
land with a high price or buy financial asset with low interest rates. The same argument
applies for the agent A at date 2t + 1. Therefore, the price of land may be higher than its
fundamental value or equivalently the bubble component lim
t→∞
Qtqt may be strictly positive.
Some observations should be mentioned.
1. Dividends are endogenous. Comparing our example in this section and that in
Section 5.1.1, the technologies of two agents A and B do not change but land dividends
change (see (39) and (42)). This difference is from the fact that land dividends are
endogenous defined.
2. With vs without short-sales. In Examples without short-sale in Section 5.1.1,
agents transfer there wealth from one date to the next date by the unique way: buying
land. However, in Example 3, they do so by investing in the financial market or buying
land. Thanks to the financial market, land is used by the most productive agent in
Example 3. This is not true when agents are prevented from borrowing as showed in
Section 5.1.1.
6 Extension: a stochastic model
In this section, we will extend our analysis to the stochastic case and discuss the land
valuation.
6.1 Framework and basic properties
In this section, we present a stochastic model which is based on the deterministic model
in Section 2 and that in the literature of infinite-horizon incomplete markets as Magill and
Quinzii (1994), Magill and Quinzii (1996), Kubler and Schmedders (2003), Magill and Quinzii
(2008) and references therein, or more recently Araujo et al. (2011), Pascoa et al. (2011).
Consider an infinite-horizon discrete time economy where the set of dates is 0, 1, ... and
there is no uncertainty at initial date (t = 0). Given a history of realizations of the states
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of nature for the first t− 1 dates, with t ≥ 1, s¯t = (s0, ..., st−1), there is a finite set S(s¯t) of
states that may occur at date t. A vector ξ = (t, s¯t, s), where t ≥ 1 and s ∈ S(s¯t), is called
a node. The only node at t = 0 is denoted by ξ0. Let D be the (countable) event-tree, i.e.,
the set of all nodes. We denote by t(ξ) the date associated with a node ξ.
Given ξ := (t, s¯t, s) and µ := (t
′, s¯t′ , s′), we say that µ is a successor of ξ, and we write
µ > ξ, if t′ > t and the first t + 1 coordinates of s¯t′ are (s¯t, s). We write µ ≥ ξ to say that
either µ > ξ or µ = ξ.
For each T and ξ, we denote D(ξ) := {µ : µ ≥ ξ} the sub-tree with root ξ; DT := {ξ :
t(ξ) = T} the family of nodes with date T ; DT (ξ) :=
T⋃
t=t(ξ)
Dt(ξ), where DT (ξ) := DT ∩D(ξ);
DT := DT (ξ0); ξ
+ := {µ ≥ ξ : t(µ) = t(ξ) + 1} the set of immediate successors of ξ; ξ− the
unique predecessor of ξ.
There is a single consumption good (which is set to be the nume´raire) at each node.
I = {1, 2, . . . ,m} denotes the set of agents. At each node ξ, each agent i is endowed ei,ξ > 0
units of consumption good.
There is a single short-lived asset that can be traded at any node. Each unit of asset
purchased at node ξ is a claim to the contingent vector (Rξ′)ξ′∈ξ+ of positive real dividends
in units of the consumption good. To simplify the presentation, consider the simple case
where the dividends are non-risky, i.e., Rξ′ = 1 ∀ξ′.
Each household i takes the sequence of prices (q, r) := (qξ, rξ)ξ∈D as given and chooses
sequences of consumption, land, and asset volume (ci, li, ai) := (ci,ξ, li,ξ, ai,ξ)ξ∈D in order to
maximizes her intertemporal utility
Pi(q, r) : max
(ci,li,ai)
[
Ui(ci) :=
∑
ξ∈D
ui,ξ(ci,ξ)
]
subject to, for all ξ ≥ ξ0,
li,ξ ≥ 0 (44)
ci,ξ + qξli,ξ + rξai,ξ ≤ ei,ξ + qξli,ξ− + Fi,ξ(li,ξ−) + ai,ξ− (45)
ai,ξ ≥ −fi
[
qξ′li,ξ + Fi,ξ′(li,ξ)
] ∀ξ′ ∈ ξ+, (46)
where li,ξ−0 > 0 is given and ai,ξ
−
0
= 0. Notice that we allow for non-stationary production
functions.
The deterministic model corresponds to the case where D = {0, 1, 2, . . .} and ui,ξ(c) =
β
t(ξ)
i ui(c). Another particular case of our model, where Fi,ξ = 0, fi = 0 ∀i,∀ξ, and there is
no short-sale, corresponds to Pascoa et al. (2011). In this case, land can be interpreted as
fiat money. However, Pascoa et al. (2011) assume that agents have money endowments at
each node while we consider that agents have land endowments only at initial node.
Since constraint (46) can be interpreted as a collateral constraint, our stochastic model is
also related to Gottardi and Kubler (2015) where they construct a tractable model with col-
lateral constraints and complete markets, and provide sufficient conditions for the existence
of Markov equilibria. However, when financial markets are incomplete like in our model,
as mentioned by Gottardi and Kubler (2015), it is not easy to find out robust equilibrium
properties.
If we consider fi = 1, constraint (46) corresponds to solvency constraint (4) in Chien
and Lustig (2010) where they consider a model with a continuum of identical agents and a
complete menu of contingent claims. In our model, there are a finite number of heterogeneous
agents but financial markets are incomplete.
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The economy is denoted by E characterized by a list of fundamentals
Es :=
(
(ui,ξ, ei,ξ, Fi,ξ)ξ∈D, fi, li,ξ−0
)
i∈I
.
Definition 6. Given the economy Es, a list
(
q¯ξ, r¯ξ, (c¯i,ξ, l¯i,ξ, a¯i,ξ)
m
i=1
)
ξ∈D
is an intertemporal
equilibrium if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) Price positivity: q¯ξ, r¯ξ > 0 ∀ξ.
(ii) Market clearing: for all ξ,
good:
m∑
i=1
c¯i,ξ =
m∑
i=1
(ei,ξ + Fi,ξ(l¯i,ξ−)) (47)
land:
m∑
i=1
l¯i,ξ = L (48)
financial asset:
m∑
i=1
a¯i,ξ = 0. (49)
(iii) Agents’ optimality: for all i, (c¯i,ξ, l¯i,ξ, a¯i,ξ)ξ∈D is a solution of the problem Pi(q¯, r¯).
Some standard assumptions are required in order to get the equilibrium existence.
Assumption 6 (production functions). For all i and ξ, the function Fi,ξ is concave, con-
tinuously differentiable, F ′i,ξ > 0, Fi,ξ(0) = 0.
Assumption 7 (endowments). li,ξ−0 > 0 and ai,ξ
−
0
= 0 ∀i. ei,t > 0 ∀i, ∀t.
Assumption 8 (utility functions). For all i and ξ ∈ D, the function ui,ξ : R+ → R+ is
continuously differentiable, concave, ui,ξ(0) = 0, u
′
i,ξ > 0, u
′
i,ξ(0) =∞.
Assumption 9 (finite utility). For all i,∑
ξ∈D
ui,ξ(Wξ) <∞, where Wξ :=
m∑
i=1
(
ei,ξ + Fi,ξ(L)
)
. (50)
Under assumptions 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, we can prove, by adapting the proof in Bosi et al.
(2017b), that there exists an intertemporal equilibrium. We next provide basic equilibrium
properties.
Proposition 10.
1. Let (q, r, (ci, li, ai)i) be an equilibrium. There exists positive sequences of multipliers
(λi,ξ, ηi,ξ)ξ∈D, (µi,ξ)ξ∈D:t(ξ)≥1 such that
ci,ξ : u
′
i,ξ(ci,ξ) = λi,ξ (51)
ai,ξ : rξλi,ξ =
∑
ξ′∈ξ+
(λi,ξ′ + µi,ξ′) (52)
li,ξ : λi,ξqξ =
∑
ξ′∈ξ+
(λi,ξ′ + fiµi,ξ′)(qξ′ + F
′
i,ξ(li,ξ)) + ηi,ξ (53)
ηi,ξli,ξ = 0 (54)
µi,ξ′
(
ai,ξ + fi
[
qξ′li,ξ + Fi,ξ′(li,ξ)
])
= 0 ∀ξ′ ∈ ξ+ (55)
Transversality condition: lim
T→∞
∑
ξ∈DT
λi,ξ(qξli,ξ + rξai,ξ) = 0 (56)
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2. If the sequences (q, r, (ci, li, ai)i) and (λi, ηi, µi)i satisfy
(a) ci,ξ, li,ξ, λi,ξ, ηi,ξ, µi,ξ′ ≥ 0; qξ, rξ > 0 ∀ξ ∈ D and ∀ξ′ ∈ ξ+.
(b) conditions (45) is binding, and (44), (46), (47), (48), (49) hold;
(c) conditions (51), (52), (53), (54), (55), (56) hold;
(d)
∑
ξ∈D ui,ξ(ci,ξ) <∞ ∀i;
then (q, r, (ci, li, ai)i) is an intertemporal equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix E.
6.2 Land valuation
6.2.1 Individual valuation and bubble
We give an extension of analysis in Section 4.2. For each ξ′ ∈ ξ+, let us denote Pξξ′ the
probability that the successor of ξ is ξ′. We have
∑
ξ′∈ξ+ Pξξ′ = 1. According to (53), we
have
qξ =
∑
ξ′∈ξ+
λi,ξ′ + fiµi,ξ′
λi,ξ
(qξ′ + F
′
i,ξ′(li,ξ)) +
ηi,ξ
λi,ξ
=
∑
ξ′∈ξ+
λi,ξ′
λi,ξ
(
qξ′ + F
′
i,ξ′(li,ξ) +
Pξξ′ηi,ξ
λi,ξ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
Production return
+
fiµi,ξ′
λi,ξ′
(qξ′ + F
′
i,ξ′(li,ξ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Collateral return
)
)
(57)
Denote di,ξ′ := F
′
i,ξ′(li,ξ) +
Pξξ′ηi,ξ
λi,ξ′
+
fiµi,ξ′
λi,ξ′
(qξ′ + F
′
i,ξ′(li,ξ)) and γi,ξ′ :=
λi,ξ′
λi,ξ
∀ξ′ ∈ ξ+. For each
ξ, we denote Qi,ξ :=
∏
µ≤ξ γi,µ =
λi,ξ
λi,ξ0
. We have land price decomposition
qξ0 =
∑
ξ∈ξ+0
γi,ξ(qξ + di,ξ) =
∑
ξ∈ξ+0
Qi,ξdi,ξ +
∑
ξ∈ξ+0
γi,ξqξ
=
T∑
t=1
∑
ξ∈Dt
Qi,ξdi,ξ +
∑
ξ∈DT
Qi,ξqξ (58)
Definition 7 (individual bubble). FVi :=
∞∑
t=1
∑
ξ∈Dt
Qi,ξdi,ξ is the i-fundamental value of land.
We say that a i-land bubble exists if qξ0 > FVi.
This can be viewed as a generalized version of fiat money valuation in Pascoa et al. (2011)
which corresponds to the case where Fi,ξ = 0 and short-sales are not allowed i.e., fi = 0.
The following result shows the role of heterogeneity of agents.
Proposition 11. 1. If there is M > 0 such that λi,ξ/λj,ξ < M ∀i, ∀j,∀ξ, then q0 = FVi
∀i.
2. If there exists t0 such that γi,ξ = γj,ξ ∀i,∀j,∀ξ with t(ξ) ≥ t0, then q0 = FVi ∀i.
Proof. Since point 2 is a direct consequence of point 1, let us prove point 1. Given i. We
have λi,ξ(qξlj,ξ + rξaj,ξ) ≤Mλj,ξ(qξlj,ξ + rξaj,ξ), so
lim
T→∞
∑
ξ∈DT
λi,ξ(qξlj,ξ + rξaj,ξ) = 0 (59)
for any j. Taking the sum over j, we have limT→∞
∑
ξ∈DT λi,ξqξL = 0 which implies that
q0 = FVi.
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6.2.2 In search of a theory of valuation
Given a node ξ, since
∑
i li,ξ = L > 0, there exists i = i(ξ) such that li,ξ > 0. By combining
this with condition (53) in Proposition 10, we have
qξ =
∑
ξ′∈ξ+
λi,ξ′ + fiµi,ξ′
λi,ξ
(
qξ′ + F
′
i,ξ′(li,ξ)
)
. (60)
Corollary 7. Consider a particular case (the Lucas tree): Fi,ξ(x) = dξx ∀i, ∀ξ. For each ξ,
there is a state-price process (γξ′)ξ′∈ξ+ such that
qξ =
∑
ξ′∈ξ+
γξ′
(
qξ′ + dξ′
)
(61)
Equation (61) is the traditional intertemporal no-arbitrage. According to this result, we
can apply the approach of Santos and Woodford (1997). In the deterministic case, we have
proved that there is a unique state-price process (γt) given by γt = rt−1 ∀t ≥ 0. However, in
the stochastic case with incomplete markets, the uniqueness of (γξ) is not ensured. Indeed,
for each i,
(λi,ξ′+fiµi,ξ′
λi,ξ
)
ξ′∈ξ+ is a state-prices process.
In the standard case where assets have exogenous dividends, it is sufficient to define state-
price process in order to evaluate assets as in Santos and Woodford (1997), Montrucchio
(2004). In our model, not only state-prices process but also dividends need to be defined.
So, what is the dividend of land? It is value added that land brings for the economy. Since
land can be used by any agent, dividend of land at note ξ′ ∈ ξ+ should be greater than
mini F
′
i,ξ′(li,ξ). This idea leads to the following concept.
Definition 8. Consider an equilibrium and fix a node ξ. Γξ := (γξ′ , dξ′)ξ′∈ξ+ is called a
state-price (or discount factor) and land dividend process if
dξ′ ≥ min
i
F ′i,ξ′(li,ξ) ∀ξ′ ∈ ξ+ (62)
qξ =
∑
ξ′∈ξ+
γξ′
(
qξ′ + dξ′
)
(63)
According to (57) or (60), the set of all state-price and land dividend process is not
empty. Definition 8 covers the traditional intertemporal pricing of assets with exogenous
dividends (Santos and Woodford, 1997; Montrucchio, 2004). It also covers the concepts of
(individual) dividends of land in our deterministic case and in Section 6.2.1 for the stochastic
case. Moreover, we propose an approach for valuation of productive assets which are more
general than the fiat money in Pascoa et al. (2011).
Miao and Wang (2012, 2015) also consider valuation of stocks with endogenous dividends.
However, their approach cannot be applied for valuation of land in our model because land
can be used by many agents while a stock in Miao and Wang (2012, 2015) is issued by only
one firm and stock dividends are taken as given by other agents.
Given a process of state-price and land dividend Γ := (γξ, dξ)ξ∈D, let us denote Qξ :=∏
ξ′≤ξ γξ′ . Hence, we can provide
qξ0 =
T∑
t=1
∑
ξ∈Dt
Qξdξ +
∑
ξ∈DT
Qξqξ (64)
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Definition 9. Given a process of state-price and land dividend Γ := (γξ, dξ)ξ∈D, the funda-
mental value of land associated to this process is defined by FVΓ :=
∞∑
t=1
∑
ξ∈Dt
Qξdξ. We say
that a Γ-land bubble exists if qξ0 > FVΓ.
One may ask whether we can choose dξ = 0 ∀ξ, which implies the fundamental value
of land equals zero, and then say that bubbles always exist. This cannot be done because
condition (62) in Definition 8 must be respected.
Before providing results on land-price bubbles, we present the assumption of uniform
impatience mentioned in Levine and Zame (1996), Magill and Quinzii (1994), Santos and
Woodford (1997), Pascoa et al. (2011).
Given a consumption plan c = (cµ)µ∈D, a node ξ, a vector (γ, δ) ∈ (0, 1)×R+, we define
another consumption plan, called z = z(c, ξ, γ, δ), by
zµ = cµ ∀µ ∈ D \D(ξ) (65)
zξ = cξ + δ (66)
zµ = γcµ ∀µ > ξ. (67)
Assumption 10 (Uniform impatience). There exists γ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all consumption
plan c = (cµ) with 0 ≤ cµ ≤ Wµ ∀µ ∈ D, we have
Ui
(
z(c, ξ, γ′,Wξ)
)
> Ui(c) ∀i,∀ξ ∈ D,∀γ′ ∈ [γ, 1). (68)
One can prove, by using the same argument in Proposition 1 in Pascoa et al. (2011), that
when (Wξ)ξ∈D is bounded, the standard utility function Ui(c) =
∑
ξ β
t(ξ)
i Pi,ξui(cξ), where
βi ∈ (0, 1) and Pi,ξ (the probability to reach node ξ) is strictly positive, satisfies Assumption
10.
The main contribution of this section is to provide conditions under which bubbles are
ruled out.
Proposition 12. Let Assumption 10 be satisfied and consider an equilibrium (q, r, (ci, li, ai)i).
1. (Endogenous condition.) For any Γ such that limt→∞
∑
ξ∈Dt QξWξ = 0, we have qξ0 =
FVΓ .
2. (Exogenous condition.) Assume that supξWξ <∞. Assume also that infi,ξ F ′i,ξ(L) > 0.
For any process of state-price and land dividend, there is no land asset bubble, i.e.,
qξ0 = FVΓ ∀Γ.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Let us explain the intuition of point 1 of Proposition Proposition 12. Thanks to uniform
impatience, the ratio of savings to wealth is uniformly bounded. When the discounted value
of aggregate wealth is vanishing at infinity, the discounted value of aggregate land quantity
at infinity must be zero, i.e., bubbles are ruled out.
Some comments should be mentioned.
• Point 1 of Proposition 12 is related to Theorem 3.3 in Santos and Woodford (1997). The
common point is that the uniform impatience is required. However, there are two main
differences: (1) we deal with land (which has endogenous dividends because anyone
can use land to produce) while Santos and Woodford (1997) work with exogenous
dividends, and (ii) we only need limt→∞
∑
ξ∈Dt QξWξ = 0 while Santos and Woodford
(1997) require
∑
t≥1
∑
ξ∈Dt QξWξ <∞.
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• Point 2 of Proposition 12 complements Proposition 7 in the current paper. Proposition
12 needs the uniform impatience but borrowing limits (fi) can be arbitrary in [0, 1]
while Proposition 7 does not need the uniform impatience but there is no uncertainty
and the financial system must be good enough in the sense that fi = 1 ∀i.
• Corollary 1 in Pascoa et al. (2011) indicates that there exists a plan of non-arbitrage
deflators for which fiat money has a bubble. However, under conditions of point 2 of
Proposition 12, there is no land bubble for any process of state-prices and dividends.
So, the insight in Corollary 1 in Pascoa et al. (2011) may not hold when we work with
productive assets such as land in our model.
7 Conclusion
We have built dynamic general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents and incomplete
financial markets, which cover a large class of models used in macroeconomics. First-order
and transversality conditions have been proved. Contrary to standard capital accumulation
models a` la Ramsey, in our model the most patient may not hold the entire stock of land in
the long run.
Our paper has provided an approach to the valuation of land. In a bounded economy
with stationary production functions and uniform impatience, for any process of state-prices
and dividends the price of land equals its fundamental value associated to this process; this
holds whatever the level of borrowing limit and of market incompleteness. A number of
examples of (individual) bubbles are provided in economies with and without short-sales.
Our approach can be used to evaluate other kinds of asset or input such as house or physical
capital.
Appendices
A Proofs for Section 2.1
Proof of part 1 of Proposition 1. Let us prove the transversality condition.14 Notice that our
method here is different from Araujo et al. (2011). Denote xi := (li, ai) = (li,t, ai,t)t. We say that
xi is feasible if, for all t, we have li,t ≥ 0 and
ai,t ≥ −fi(qt+1li,t + Fi(li,t))
qtli,t + rtai,t ≤ ei,t + qtli,t−1 + Fi(li,t−1) + ai,t−1.
We claim that: if xi is feasible, then (xi,0, . . . , xi,t−1, λxi,t, λxi,t+1, . . .) is also feasible for all
t ≥ 1 and λ ∈ [0, 1].
We have to prove that:
qtλli,t + λrtai,t ≤ ei,t + qtli,t−1 + Fi(li,t−1) + ai,t−1 (A.1)
and
λqs+1li,s+1 + λrs+1ai,s+1 ≤ ei,s+1 + λqs+1li,s + Fi(λli,s) + λai,s (A.2)
λai,s + fi(λqs+1li,s + Fi(λli,s)) ≥ 0 (A.3)
for all s ≥ t.
14FOCs are obtained by applying the proof of Proposition 10 in Appendix E.
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(A.2) and (A.3) are proved by using the fact that Fi(λx) ≥ λFi(x) ∀λ ∈ [0, 1].
(A.1) is satisfied if qtli,t + rtai,t < 0. If qtli,t + rtai,t ≥ 0, we have
qtλli,t + λrtai,t ≤ qtli,t + rtai,t ≤ ei,t + qtli,t−1 + Fi(li,t−1) + ai,t−1.
So, our claim is proved.
By using the same argument in Theorem 2.1 in Kamihigashi (2002),15 we obtain that lim sup
t→∞
λi,t(qtli,t+
rtai,t) ≤ 0.
According to FOCs, we now have
λi,t(ci,t + qtli,t + rtai,t) = λi,t(ei,t + qtli,t−1 + Fi(li,t−1) + ai,t−1) (A.4)
λi,trtai,t = (λi,t+1 + µi,t+1)ai,t (A.5)
λi,tqtli,t = (λi,t+1 + fiµi,t+1)(qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t))li,t (A.6)
µi,t+1
(
ai,t + fi(qt+1li,t + Fi(li,t))
)
= 0. (A.7)
(A.5) and (A.6) imply that
λi,t(qtli,t + rtai,t)
= (λi,t+1 + fiµi,t+1)(qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t))li,t + (λi,t+1 + µi,t+1)ai,t
= λi,t+1ai,t + λi,t+1
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
li,t
+ µi,t+1
(
ai,t + fi
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
li,t
)
.
Therefore, by combining this with (A.7), we get that
λi,t(qtli,t + rtai,t)− λi,t+1ai,t − λi,t+1
(
qt+1li,t + Fi(li,t)
)
= λi,t+1
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
li,t + µi,t+1
(
ai,t + fi
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
li,t
)
− λi,t+1
(
qt+1li,t + Fi(li,t)
)
(A.8)
= −λi,t+1(Fi(li,t)− li,tF ′i (li,t)) + µi,t+1
(
ai,t + fi
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
li,t
)
− µi,t+1
(
ai,t + fi
(
qt+1li,t + Fi(li,t)
))
(A.9)
= −λi,t+1(Fi(li,t)− li,tF ′i (li,t))− fiµi,t+1(Fi(li,t)− li,tF ′i (li,t)) (A.10)
By summing (A.4) from t = 0 to T , and then using (A.8), we obtain that
T∑
t=0
λi,tci,t + λi,T (qT li,T + rTai,T ) =
T∑
t=0
λi,tei,t + λi,0(q0li,−1 + Fi(li,−1) + ai,−1)
+
T∑
t=1
(λi,t + fiµi,t)(Fi(li,t−1)− li,t−1F ′i (li,t−1)). (A.11)
Under Assumption (5), the utility of agent i is finite, thus we have
∞∑
t=0
λi,tci,t =
∞∑
t=0
βtiu
′
i(ci,t)ci,t ≤
∞∑
t=0
βtiui(ci,t) <∞. (A.12)
Combining this with the fact that lim sup
t→∞
λi,t(qtli,t + rtai,t) ≤ 0, and (A.11), we obtain that there
exists the following sum
∞∑
t=0
λi,tei,t +
∞∑
t=1
(λi,t + fiµi,t)(Fi(li,t−1)− li,t−1F ′i (li,t−1)) <∞.
15Kamihigashi (2002) only considers positive allocations while ai,t may be negative in our model.
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We now use (A.11) to get that lim
t→∞λi,t(qtli,t + rtai,t) exists and it is non positive.
We again use (A.4) and note that qtli,t−1 + Fi(li,t−1) + ai,t−1 ≥ 0 (because of borrowing con-
straint) to obtain that lim inf
t→∞ λi,t(ci,t + qtli,t + rtai,t) ≥ 0.
(A.12) implies that lim
t→∞λi,tci,t = 0. As a result, we get lim inft→∞ λi,t(qtli,t + rtai,t) ≥ 0. Therefore,
we have lim
t→∞λi,t(qtli,t + rtai,t) = 0 and then
∞ >
∞∑
t=0
λi,tci,t =
∞∑
t=0
λi,tei,t +
∞∑
t=1
(λi,t + fiµi,t)(Fi(li,t−1)− li,t−1F ′i (li,t−1))
+ λi,0(q0li,−1 + Fi(li,−1) + ai,−1). (A.13)
Proof of part 2 of Proposition 1. Before proving this part, we should notice that this result
requires neither ui(0) = 0 nor u
′
i(0) = ∞. Let us prove our result. It is sufficient to prove
the optimality of (ci, ai, li) for all i. Let (c
′
i, a
′
i, l
′
i) be a plan satisfying all budget and borrowing
constraints and l′i,−1 − li,−1 = 0 = a′i,−1 = ai,−1. We have
T∑
t=0
βti(ui(ci,t)− ui(c′i,t)) ≥
T∑
t=0
βtiu
′
i(ci,t)(ci,t − c′i,t) =
T∑
t=0
λi,t(ci,t − c′i,t)
According to FOCs, we now have
λi,t(c
′
i,t + qtl
′
i,t + rta
′
i,t) = λi,t(ei,t + qtl
′
i,t−1 + Fi(l
′
i,t−1) + a
′
i,t−1) (A.14)
rtλi,ta
′
i,t = (λi,t+1 + µi,t+1)a
′
i,t (A.15)
λi,tqtl
′
i,t = (λi,t+1 + fiµi,t+1)(qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t))l
′
i,t + ηi,tl
′
i,t (A.16)
µi,t+1
(
ai,t + fi(qt+1li,t + Fi(li,t))
)
= 0. (A.17)
(A.15) and (A.16) imply that
λi,t(qtl
′
i,t + rta
′
i,t)
= (λi,t+1 + fiµi,t+1)(qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t))l
′
i,t + ηi,tl
′
i,t + (λi,t+1 + µi,t+1)a
′
i,t
= λi,t+1a
′
i,t + λi,t+1
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
l′i,t + ηi,tl
′
i,t + µi,t+1
(
a′i,t + fi
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
l′i,t
)
.
Therefore, by combining this with (A.17), we get that
λi,t(qtl
′
i,t + rta
′
i,t)− λi,t+1a′i,t − λi,t+1
(
qt+1l
′
i,t + Fi(l
′
i,t)
)
= λi,t+1
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
l′i,t + ηi,tl
′
i,t + µi,t+1
(
a′i,t + fi
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
l′i,t
)
− λi,t+1
(
qt+1l
′
i,t + Fi(l
′
i,t)
)
= −λi,t+1(Fi(l′i,t)− l′i,tF ′i (li,t)) + ηi,tl′i,t + µi,t+1
(
a′i,t + fi
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
l′i,t
)
. (A.18)
According to budget constraints, we have
λi,t+1(ei,t+1 − c′i,t+1) + λi,t(qtl′i,t + rta′i,t)− λi,t+1(qt+1l′i,t+1 + rt+1a′i,t+1)
= λi,t(qtl
′
i,t + rta
′
i,t)− λi,t+1a′i,t − λi,t+1
(
qt+1l
′
i,t + Fi(l
′
i,t)
)
(A.19)
λi,0p0(ei,0 − c′i,0)− λi,0(q0l′i,0 + r0a′i,0) + λi,0
(
q0l
′
i,−1 + Fi(l
′
i,−1)
)
= 0. (A.20)
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By summing these constraints and using (A.18), we obtain that
[ T∑
t=0
λi,t(ei,t − c′i,t)
]
− λi,T (qT l′i,T + rTa′i,T ) + λi,0
(
q0l
′
i,−1 + Fi(l
′
i,−1)
)
=
T∑
t=1
[
− λi,t
(
Fi(l
′
i,t−1)− l′i,t−1F ′i (li,t−1)
)
+ ηi,t−1l′i,t−1 + µi,t
(
a′i,t−1 + fi
(
qt + F
′
i (li,t−1)
)
l′i,t−1
]
Since this is satisfied for any feasible allocation (c′i, a
′
i, l
′
i), this also holds for the allocation (ci, ai, li).
Consequently, we get that
[ T∑
t=0
λi,t(ci,t − c′i,t)
]
= λi,T (qT l
′
i,T + rTa
′
i,T )− λi,T (qT li,T + rTai,T )
+
T∑
t=1
[
− λi,t
(
Fi(l
′
i,t−1)− l′i,t−1F ′i (li,t−1)
)
+ ηi,t−1l′i,t−1 + µi,t
(
a′i,t−1 + fi
(
qt + F
′
i (li,t−1)
)
l′i,t−1
)]
−
T∑
t=1
[
− λi,t
(
Fi(li,t−1)− li,t−1F ′i (li,t−1)
)
+ ηi,t−1li,t−1 + µi,t
(
ai,t−1 + fi
(
qt + F
′
i (li,t−1)
)
li,t−1
)]
= λi,T (qT l
′
i,T + rTa
′
i,T )− λi,T (qT li,T + rTai,T ) +
T∑
t=1
ηi,t−1(l′i,t−1 − li,t−1)
+
T∑
t=1
λi,t
[
Fi(li,t−1)− Fi(l′i,t−1)− (li,t−1 − l′i,t−1)F ′(li,t−1)
]
+
T∑
t=1
µi,t
(
a′i,t−1 + fi(qtl
′
i,t−1 + F
′
i (li,t−1)l
′
i,t−1)−
(
ai,t−1 + fi
(
qtli,t−1 + F ′i (li,t−1)li,t−1)
))
= λi,T (qT l
′
i,T + rTa
′
i,T )− λi,T (qT li,T + rTai,T ) +
T∑
t=1
ηi,t−1(l′i,t−1 − li,t−1)
+
T∑
t=1
λi,t
[
Fi(li,t−1)− Fi(l′i,t−1)− (li,t−1 − l′i,t−1)F ′(li,t−1)
]
+
T∑
t=1
fiµi,t
[
Fi(li,t−1)− Fi(l′i,t−1)− (li,t−1 − l′i,t−1)F ′(li,t−1)
]
+
T∑
t=1
µi,t
(
a′i,t−1 + fi(qtl
′
i,t−1 + Fi(l
′
i,t−1))−
[
ai,t−1 + fi
(
qtli,t−1 + Fi(li,t−1)
)])
.
Since Fi is concave, it is easy to see that Fi(li,t)− Fi(l′i,t) ≥ (li,t − l′i,t)F ′(li,t) ∀t. Thus, we obtain
T∑
t=0
βti(ui(ci,t)− ui(c′i,t)) ≥
T∑
t=0
λi,t(ci,t − c′i,t) ≥ λi,T (qT l′i,T + rTa′i,T )− λi,T (qT li,T + rTai,T ).
We will prove that lim infT→∞ λi,T (qT l′i,T + rTa
′
i,T )− λi,T (qT li,T + rTai,T ) ≥ 0. Combining this
condition and the fact that
∞∑
t=0
βtiui(ci,t) <∞, we conclude the optimality of (ci, ai, li).
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According to (A.15) and (A.16), we have
λi,t(qtl
′
i,t + rta
′
i,t)
= λi,t+1a
′
i,t + λi,t+1
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
l′i,t + ηi,tl
′
i,t + µi,t+1
(
a′i,t + fi
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
l′i,t
)
= (λi,t+1 + µi,t+1)a
′
i,t + λi,t+1
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
l′i,t + ηi,tl
′
i,t + µi,t+1fi
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
l′i,t
= (λi,t+1 + µi,t+1)
(
a′i,t + fi(qt+1l
′
i,t + Fi(l
′
i,t)
))− (λi,t+1 + µi,t+1)fi(qt+1l′i,t + Fi(l′i,t))
+ λi,t+1
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
l′i,t + ηi,tl
′
i,t + µi,t+1fi
(
qt+1l
′
i,t + F
′
i (li,t)l
′
i,t
)
= (λi,t+1 + µi,t+1)
(
a′i,t + fi(qt+1l
′
i,t + Fi(l
′
i,t)
))
+ ηi,tl
′
i,t − fi(λi,t+1 + µi,t+1)Fi(l′i,t)
− fi(λi,t+1 + µi,t+1)qt+1l′i,t + λi,t+1
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
l′i,t + µi,t+1fi
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
l′i,t
= (λi,t+1 + µi,t+1)
(
a′i,t + fi(qt+1l
′
i,t + Fi(l
′
i,t)
))
+ ηi,tl
′
i,t − fi(λi,t+1 + µi,t+1)
(
Fi(l
′
i,t)− l′i,tF ′i (li,t)
)
− (λi,t+1 + µi,t+1)fiF ′i (li,t)l′i,t − fi(λi,t+1 + µi,t+1)qt+1l′i,t
+ λi,t+1
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
l′i,t + µi,t+1fi
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
l′i,t
= (λi,t+1 + µi,t+1)
(
a′i,t + fi(qt+1l
′
i,t + Fi(l
′
i,t)
))
+ ηi,tl
′
i,t − fi(λi,t+1 + µi,t+1)
(
Fi(l
′
i,t)− l′i,tF ′i (li,t)
)
+ (1− fi)λi,t+1
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
l′i,t.
Since this is satisfied for any feasible allocation (c′i, a
′
i, l
′
i), this also holds for the allocation (ci, ai, li).
Hence, we get, by combining with FOCs of (ci, ai, li) and borrowing constraint associated to allo-
cation (c′i, a
′
i, l
′
i), that
λi,t(qtl
′
i,t + rta
′
i,t)− λi,t(qtli,t + rtai,t)
=(λi,t+1 + µi,t+1)
(
a′i,t + fi(qt+1l
′
i,t + Fi(l
′
i,t)
))− (λi,t+1 + µi,t+1)(ai,t + fi(qt+1li,t + Fi(li,t)))
+ ηi,tl
′
i,t − ηi,tli,t + fi(λi,t+1 + µi,t+1)
(
Fi(li,t)− Fi(l′i,t)− (li,t − l′i,t)F ′i (li,t
)
+ (1− fi)λi,t+1
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
l′i,t − (1− fi)λi,t+1
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
li,t
≥− λi,t+1
(
ai,t + fi(qt+1li,t + Fi(li,t)
))− (1− fi)λi,t+1(qt+1 + F ′i (li,t))li,t
As in proof of part 1 of Proposition 1, we notice that
lim
t→∞λi,tci,t = limt→∞λi,tei,t = limt→∞λi,t(qtli,t + rtai,t) = 0.
Combining this with budget constraint, we get that limt→∞ λi,t(qi,tli,t−1 + Fi(li,t−1) + ai,t−1) = 0.
Therefore limt→∞ λi,t
(
fi(qi,tli,t−1 +Fi(li,t−1)) +ai,t−1
)
= 0. Moreover, by borrowing constraint and
concavity of Fi, we have
qi,tli,t−1 + Fi(li,t−1) + ai,t−1 ≥ (1− fi)(qi,tli,t−1 + Fi(li,t−1)) ≥ (1− fi)(qi,t + F ′i (li,t−1))li,t−1
which implies that limt→∞(1− fi)λi,t(qi,t + F ′i (li,t−1))li,t−1 = 0. Therefore, we obtain that
lim inf
T→∞
λi,T (qT l
′
i,T + rTa
′
i,T )− λi,T (qT li,T + rTai,T ) ≥ 0.
Proof of Corollary 1. Assume that there exists lim
t→∞
(
Qtrtai,t + fiQt+1
[
qt+1li,t + Fi(li,t)
])
> 0.
Hence, there exists a date T ≥ 1 such that borrowing constraint (4) is not binding ∀t ≥ T. Therefore,
rtλi,t = λi,t+1 ∀t ≥ T, ∀i. By consequence, there exists Ci ∈ (0,∞) such that Qt = Ciλi,t ∀t ≥ T .
According to transversality condition (14), we get lim
t→∞Qt
(
rtai,t + qtli,t
)
= 0.
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By combining (15) and the fact that Qt = Ciλi,t ∀t ≥ T , we obtain lim
t→∞Qtci,t = limt→∞Qtei,t = 0.
Therefore, by using budget constraints, we get
lim
t→∞Qt
(
ai,t−1 + qtli,t−1 + Fi(li,t−1)
)
= 0.
Since fi ∈ [0, 1] and Qt = rt−1Qt−1, we obtain the statement (b).
Condition (17) is proved by using the same argument.
B Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Lemma 2. According to (11), we obtain qt ≥ γt+1
(
qt+1 + dt+1).
We prove the second inequality. We see that there exists an agent, say i, such that li,t > 0.
Thus, ηi,t = 0. Therefore, we have
λi,tqt = (λi,t+1 + fiµi,t+1)(qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t))
≤ (λi,t+1 + µi,t+1)(qt+1 + F ′i (li,t)) ≤ λi,trt(qt+1 + d¯t+1). (B.1)
By combining with (16), we get the second inequality in (18).
We now prove (19). According to FOCs, we get
qt =
λi,t+1 + fiµi,t+1
λi,t+1 + µi,t+1
λi,t+1 + µi,t+1
λi,t
(qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)) +
ηi,t
λi,t
(B.2)
=
λi,t+1 + fiµi,t+1
λi,t+1 + µi,t+1
rt(qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)) +
ηi,t
λi,t
(B.3)
≥ firt(qt+1 + F ′i (li,t)). (B.4)
Therefore, we obtain (19).
Proof of Lemma 3. According to (18), we obtain dt+1 ≤ d¯t+1.
Since fi = 1 ∀i or (4) is not binding for all i, we always have µi,t+1 = fiµi,t+1 ∀i. So, we get
qt = γt+1
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
+
ηi,t
λi,t
≥ γt+1
(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
for all i. Therefore dt+1 ≥ d¯t+1. As a result, we have dt+1 = d¯t+1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Since li,t > 0 at equilibrium, we have ηi,t = 0. By consequence, we
obtain that, for all i, t,
λi,trt = (λi,t+1 + µi,t+1) (B.5)
λi,tqt = (λi,t+1 + fiµi,t+1)(qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)). (B.6)
We see that, for all i, t,
qt =
λi,t+1 + fiµi,t+1
λi,t
(qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)) ≤
λi,t+1 + µi,t+1
λi,t
(qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t))
= γt+1(qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t))
Therefore, we obtain that qt ≤ γt+1
(
qt+1 + dt+1
)
. By combining with (18), we have
qt = γt+1
(
qt+1 + dt+1
)
.
As a result, we get that dt+1 = dt+1.
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Proof of Proposition 3. According to FOCs, we obtain
1 =
λi,t+1 + fiµi,t+1
λi,t+1 + µi,t+1
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
qt+1 + dt+1
+
ηi,t
λi,tqt
(B.7)
If li,t > 0, then ηi,t = 0. By combining (B.7) with fi ≤ 1, we get dt+1 ≤ F ′i (li,t).
We now assume that dt+1 < F
′
i (li,t). If (4) is not binding, we have µi,t+1 = 0 which implies
that dt+1 ≥ F ′i (li,t), contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4. Since fj = 1, condition (11) implies that
qt
qt+1 + F ′j(lj,t)
≥ λj,t+1 + µj,t+1
λj,t
= rt.
Assume that li,t > 0, we have ηi,t = 0 which implies that
qt
qt+1 + F ′i (li,t)
=
λi,t+1 + fiµi,t+1
λi,t
≤ rt ≤ qt
qt+1 + F ′j(lj,t)
.
Therefore, F ′j(L) ≤ F ′j(lj,t) ≤ F ′i (li,t) < F ′i (0), contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4. Let
(
q, r, (ci, li, ai), (cj , lj , aj)
)
be a steady state equilibrium. According to
Proposition 1, we rewrite the system (9, 10, 11, 12, 13)
βtiu
′
i(ci,t) = λi,t
rt =
(βiu′i(ci,t+1)
u′i(ci,t)
+
µi,t+1
λi,t
)
qt =
(βiu′i(ci,t+1)
u′i(ci,t)
+ fi
µi,t+1
λi,t
)(
qt+1 + F
′
i (li,t)
)
+
ηi,t+1
λi,t
ηi,tli,t = 0
µi,t+1
(
ai,t + fi
[
qt+1li,t + Fi(li,t)
])
= 0
Let us denote xi,t :=
µi,t+1
λi,t
, σi,t :=
ηi,t
λi,t
.
At steady state, we have
r = (βi + xi)
q = (βi + fixi)(q + F
′
i (li)) + σi.
Since βi < βj , we have xi > xj , which implies that xi > 0. Therefore, we obtain
ai + fi
[
qli + Fi(li)
]
= 0.
Hence, ai < 0 and then aj > 0 which implies that xj = 0. The impatient agent borrows from the
patient agent.
We consider the case where Fi(li) = Ail
α
i , Fj(li) = Ajl
α
j . Then F
′
h(lh) = αAhl
α−1
h for h = i, j.
In this case, we have li, lj > 0, hence σi = σj = 0.
We see that ai < 0, which implies that aj > 0. Hence, xj = 0. The asset price is r = βj . We
have q
(
1
βj
− 1
)
= F ′i (li) = αAjl
α−1
j , therefore
lj =
( αAj
1
βj
− 1
1
q
) 1
1−α
.
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Since βi + xi = βj + xj , we get xi = βj − βi. By consequence, we can compute
li =
( αAi
1
βi+fi(βj−βi) − 1
1
q
) 1
1−α
.
Using li + lj = L, we can compute the price of land
q
1
1−αL =
( αAi
1
βi+fi(βj−βi) − 1
) 1
1−α
+
( αAj
1
βj
− 1
) 1
1−α
.
C Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Proposition 5. According to (26), it is easy to see that a land bubble exists if and only
if lim
t→+∞Qtqt > 0.
According to (25), we get that
q0 = QT qT
T∏
t=1
(1 +
dt
qt
).
Since q0 > 0, we see that lim
t→+∞Qtqt > 0 if and only if limt→∞
T∏
t=1
(1 + dtqt ) <∞. It is easy to prove that
this condition is equivalent to
∑∞
t=1
dt
qt
< +∞.
Proof of Proposition 6. Assume that Qt/Qi,t is uniformly bounded from above. According to
Proposition 1, we have lim
t→∞Qi,t(qtli,t + rtai,t) = 0, therefore
lim
t→∞Qt(qtli,t + rtai,t) = limt→∞
( Qt
Qi,t
)(
Qi,t(qtli,t + rtai,t)
)
= 0
for any i. Note that
∑
i
li,t = L > 0 and
∑
i
ai,t = 0 ∀t, we obtain that lim
t→∞Qtqt = 0
Proof of Corollary 5. Since µi,t+1 = 0 ∀t ≥ T , we have rtλi,t = λi,t+1 ∀t ≥ T . By consequence,
γi,t = γt ∀t ≥ T + 1. This implies that Qt/Qi,t is uniformly bounded from above. According to
Proposition 6, there is no bubble.
Proof of Lemma 5. According to (26), we get
∞∑
t=0
Qtdt < ∞. However we have dt > F ′i (L) >
min
i
F ′i (L) > 0 ∀t. Therefore, we obtain
∞∑
t=0
Qt <∞. Since sup
i,t
ei,t <∞ and Fi(li,t) ≤ Fi(L) ∀i,∀t,
we obtain that
∞∑
t=0
QtYt <∞.
Proof of Lemma 6. We will claim that supi,t(Qtrtai,t) <∞. Indeed, (4) is rewritten as
Qt+1ai,t + fiQt+1
(
qt+1li,t + Fi(li,t)
)
≥ 0. (C.1)
Since Qt+1 = rtQt, (4) is equivalent to
Qtrtai,t ≥ −fiQt+1
(
qt+1li,t + Fi(li,t)
)
. (C.2)
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It is easy to see that 0 ≤ Qtqtli,t−1 ≤ q0L <∞. Therefore, we have
fiQt+1
(
qt+1li,t + Fi(li,t)
)
≤ fiq0L+ fiQt+1Fi(L). (C.3)
By consequence, we obtain
Qtrtai,t ≥ −fiq0L− fiQt+1Fi(L). (C.4)
According to the proof of Lemma 5 , we see that limt→∞Qt = 0, and hence we get that
infi,tQtrtai,t > −∞. Since
∑m
i=1Qtrtai,t = 0, we have −∞ < infi,tQtrtai,t ≤ supi,tQtrtai,t <
∞.
Proof of Lemma 7. We rewrite the budget constraint of agent i at date t as follows
Qtci,t +Qtqtli,t +Qtrtai,t = Qt(ei,t + Fi(li,t−1)) +Qtqtli,t−1 +Qtai,t−1. (C.5)
According to (16) and (20), we get
Qtqt = Qt+1
(
qt+1 + dt+1
)
, Qtrt = Qt+1.
Therefore, we have
T∑
t=0
Qtci,t +
T∑
t=1
Qtdtli,t−1 +QT (qT li,T + rTai,T ) =
T∑
t=0
Qt(ei,t + Fi(li,t−1)) + q0li,−1 + ai,−1.
By combining this with Lemmas 5 and 6, we obtain that
sup
T→∞
( T∑
t=0
Qtci,t +
T∑
t=1
Qtdtli,t−1
)
<∞.
This implies that there exists the sum
∞∑
t=0
(Qtci,t +Qtdtli,t−1), and so does lim
t→∞Qt
(
qtli,t + rtai,t
)
.
Note that lim
t→∞Qtci,t = limt→∞Qt(ei,t + Fi(li,t−1)) = 0. Then, by using (C.5), we get (27).
Proof of Lemma 8. If lim
t→∞Qt
(
rtai,t+qtli,t
)
> 0, there exists T1 ≥ T such that Qt
(
rtai,t+qtli,t
)
>
0 ∀t ≥ T1. Hence, we get
Qt+1ai,t + fiQt+1
[
qt+1li,t + Fi(li,t)
]
≥ Qt+1ai,t +Qt+1
[
qt+1 + dt+1
]
li,t = Qt+1ai,t +Qtqtli,t > 0
∀t ≥ T1. This implies that µi,t+1 = 0 ∀t ≥ T1
Therefore, rtλi,t = λi,t+1 ∀t ≥ T1. By consequence, there exists Ci > 0 such that Qt =
Ciλi,t ∀t ≥ T1. According to transversality condition (14), we get lim
t→∞Qt
(
rtai,t + qtli,t
)
= 0,
contradiction.
Proof of Propostion 7. If li,t = 0, then condition (28) is satisfied.
If li,t > 0, by combining with fi = 1 and using Lemma 3, we have dt = F
′
i (li,t−1) ≤
Fi(li,t−1)
li,t−1
.
Therefore, condition (28) is satisfied. By consequence, we have lim
t→∞Qt
(
rtai,t + qtli,t
) ≤ 0 ∀i. By
summing this inequality over i, we obtain lim
t→∞QtqtL ≤ 0, which implies that bubbles are ruled
out.
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Proof of Proposition 9. 1. Since Qt ≥ Qi,t, it is easy to see that FV0 ≤ FVi ∀i, and if an i-land
bubble exists for some agent i then a land bubble exists.
2. Assume that i-bubble exists for any t, we have lim
t→∞Qi,tqt > 0 ∀i. Therefore, we get
lim
t→∞Qtqt > 0. Since both these two limits are finite (less than q0) and strictly positive, we see that
lim
t→∞Qt/Qi,t ∈ (0,∞) ∀i. According to Proposition 6 we have limt→∞Qtqt = 0, contradiction.
3. We now assume that FV0 = FVi ∀i, which implies that lim
t→∞Qtqt = limt→∞Qi,tqt. If a
land bubble exists, we have lim
t→∞Qtqt = limt→∞Qi,tqt ∈ (0, q0). Thus, we obtain limt→∞Qi,t/Qt = 1.
According to Proposition 6 we have lim
t→∞Qtqt = 0 = limt→∞Qi,tqt, contradiction.
D Proofs for Section 5
First, we give sufficient conditions for a sequence
(
qt, (ci,t, li,t)i∈I
)
t
to be an equilibrium. Notice
that the utility function may satisfy ui(0) = −∞.
Lemma 9. If a sequence
(
qt, (ci,t, li,t, µi,t)i∈I
)
t
satisfies the following conditions
(i) ∀t, ∀i, ci,t > 0, li,t > 0, µi,t > 0. ∀t, qt > 0,
(ii) first-order conditions:
qt =
βiu
′
i(ci,t+1)
u′i(ci,t)
(
qt+1 + F
′
i,t(li,t)
)
+ ηi,t, ηi,tli,t = 0, (D.1)
(iii) transversality conditions: lim
t→∞β
t
iu
′
i(ci,t)qtli,t = 0 ∀i,
(iv) ci,t + qtli,t = ei,t + qtli,t−1 + Fi,t(li,t−1),
(vi)
∑
i∈I li,t = L,
then the sequence
(
qt, (ci,t, li,t)i∈I
)
t
is an equilibrium for the economy without financial market.
Proof. Using the same argument in the proof of Proposition 1.
D.1 Check for the example in Section 5.1.1
We now check all conditions in Lemma 9. It is easy to see that the market clearing conditions are
satisfied. Let us check FOCs:
q2t =
βBu
′
B(cB,2t+1)
u′B(cB,2t)
(
q2t+1 +B2t+1
) ≥ βAu′A(cA,2t+1)
u′A(cA,2t)
(q2t+1 +A2t+1) (D.2)
q2t−1 =
βAu
′
A(cA,2t)
u′A(cA,2t−1)
(q2t +A2t) ≥ βBu
′
B(cB,2t)
u′B(cB,2t−1)
(q2t +B2t). (D.3)
The equality in (D.2) is satisfied because
βBu
′
B(cB,2t+1)
u′B(cB,2t)
(
q2t+1 +B2t+1
)
=
βB(eB,2t − q2t)
q2t+1 +B2t+1
(
q2t+1 +B2t+1
)
(D.4)
= βB(eB,2t − q2t) = q2t. (D.5)
We now prove the inequality in (D.2). We have
βAu
′
A(cA,2t+1)
u′A(cA,2t)
(q2t+1 +A2t+1) =
βA(q2t +A2t)
eA,2t+1 − q2t+1 (q2t+1 +A2t+1) (D.6)
=
βA(
βB
1+βB
eB,2t +A2t)
1
1+βA
eA,2t+1
(
βA
1 + βA
eA,2t+1 +A2t+1) (D.7)
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By consequence, the inequality in (D.2) is equivalent to
βA(
βBeB,2t
1 + βB
+A2t)(
βAeA,2t+1
1 + βA
+A2t+1) ≤ βB eB,2t
1 + βB
eA,2t+1
1 + βA
(D.8)
which is the condition (31).
We have
βBu
′
B(cB,2t)
u′B(cB,2t−1)
(q2t +B2t) =
βB(q2t−1 +B2t−1)
eB,2t − q2t (q2t +B2t) (D.9)
=
βB(
βA
1+βA
eA,2t−1 +B2t−1)
1
1+βB
eB,2t
(
βB
1 + βB
eB,2t +B2t) (D.10)
By consequence, the inequality in (D.3) is equivalent to
βB(
βAeA,2t−1
1 + βA
+B2t−1)(
βBeB,2t
1 + β
+B2t) ≤ βA eB,2t
1 + βB
eA,2t−1
1 + βA
(D.11)
which is the condition (32).
We now check TVCs. We have
β2tA u
′
A(cA,2t)q2tlA,2t+1 = 0 and β
2t−1
A u
′
A(cA,2t−1)q2t−1lA,2t =
β2t−1A
cA,2t−1
q2t−1 = β2tA → 0. (D.12)
Similarly, we also have
β2tB u
′
B(cB,2t)q2tlB,2t+1 = β
2t+1
B → 0 and β2t−1B u′B(cB,2t−1)q2t−1lB,2t = 0. (D.13)
We finally verify that, for all t ≥ 0,
βBu
′
B(cB,2t+1)
u′B(cB,2t)
≥ βAu
′
A(cA,2t+1)
u′A(cA,2t)
(D.14)
βBu
′
B(cB,2t)
u′B(cB,2t−1)
≤ βAu
′
A(cA,2t)
u′A(cA,2t−1)
. (D.15)
Indeed, condition (D.14) is rewritten as
βB(eB,2t − q2t)
q2t+1 +B2t+1
≥
βA(
βB
1+βB
eB,2t +A2t)
1
1+βA
eA,2t+1
. (D.16)
Since q2t =
βB
1+βB
eB,2t, q2t+1 =
βA
1+βA
eA,2t+1, condition (D.14) is equivalent to
βA(
βBeB,2t
1 + βB
+A2t)(
βAeA,2t+1
1 + βA
+B2t+1) ≤ βB eB,2t
1 + βB
eA,2t+1
1 + βA
. (D.17)
This is condition (33).
By the same argument, we see that condition (D.15) is equivalent to
βB(
βAeA,2t−1
1 + βA
+B2t−1)(
βBeB,2t
1 + β
+A2t) ≤ βA eB,2t
1 + βB
eA,2t−1
1 + βA
. (D.18)
This is condition (34).
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D.2 Check for the example in Section 5.2
We will find equilibria such that
(lA,2t−1, lB,2t−1) = (0, 1), (lA,2t, lB,2t) = (1, 0) (D.19)
aA,2t−1 = q2t +B2t = −aB,2t−1, aB,2t = q2t+1 +A2t+1 = −aA,2t ∀t ≥ 1. (D.20)
It means that at any even (odd) date, agent A (agent B) borrows until her borrowing constraint is
binding and buys land.16 In this case, we have
∀t ≥ 0, cA,2t + q2t + r2taA,2t = eA,2t + aA,2t−1
∀t ≥ 0, cA,2t+1 + r2t+1aA,2t+1 = eA,2t+1
cB,0 + r0aB,0 = eB,0 + q0 +B0
∀t ≥ 1, cB,2t + r2taB,2t = eB,2t
∀t ≥ 0, cB,2t+1 + q2t+1 + r2t+1aB,2t+1 = eB,2t+1 + aB,2t
Since aB,2t > 0 and aA,2t−1 > 0, we have µB,2t+1 = µA,2t = 0. Since agent A produces at date
2t+ 1 and agent B produces at date 2t, we have ηA,2t = ηB,2t−1 = 0.
We have to find land prices and interest rates satisfying first-order and transversality conditions.
Transversality conditions (14) are written lim
t→∞β
tu′i(ci,t)(qtli,t + rtai,t) = 0 ∀i, or equivalently
lim
t→∞
β2t(q2t − r2t(q2t+1 +A2t+1))
eA,2t + (q2t +B2t)− q2t + r2t(q2t+1 +A2t+1) = 0, limt→∞
β2t+1r2t+1(q2t+2 +B2t+2)
eA,2t+1 − r2t+1(q2t+2 +B2t+2) = 0
lim
t→∞
β2tr2t(q2t+1 +A2t+1)
eB,2t − r2t(q2t+1 +A2t+1) = 0, limt→∞
β2t+1(q2t+1 − r2t+1(q2t+2 +B2t+2))
eB,2t+1 + (q2t+1 +A2t+1)− q2t+1 + r2t+1(q2t+2 +B2t+2) = 0.
FOCs can be rewritten as
r0 = β
eB,0 + q0 +B0 − r0(q1 +A1)
eB,1 + (q1 +A1)− q1 + r1(q2 +B2) > β
eA,0 − q0 + r0(q1 +A1)
eA,1 − r1(q2 +B2) (D.21)
r2t = β
eB,2t − r2t(q2t+1 +A2t+1)
eB,2t+1 + (q2t+1 +A2t+1)− q2t+1 + r2t+1(q2t+2 +B2t+2)
> β
eA,2t + (q2t +B2t)− q2t + r2t(q2t+1 +A2t+1)
eA,2t+1 − r2t+1(q2t+2 +B2t+2) (D.22)
r2t−1 = β
eA,2t−1 − r2t−1(q2t +B2t)
eA,2t + (q2t +B2t)− q2t + r2t(q2t+1 +A2t+1)
> β
eB,2t−1 + (q2t−1 +A2t−1)− q2t−1 + r2t−1(q2t +B2t)
eB,2t − r2t(q2t+1 +A2t+1) . (D.23)
Condition (D.21) means that r0 = γB,1 > γA,1. Condition (D.22) means that r2t = γB,2t+1 > γA,2t+1
while condition (D.23) means that r2t−1 = γA,2t > γB,2t. This implies that γ2t = γA,2t and
γ2t+1 = γB,2t+1.
It is easy to check that in our example, all first-order and transversality conditions are satisfied.
E Proofs for Section 6
E.1 Proof of Proposition 10
We present a proof for the case where there are many consumption goods, the claim of the short-
lived asset at node ξ is a positive vector (Rξ′)ξ′∈ξ+ and production function Fi,ξ are non-stationary.
16We need this because Corollary 6 indicates that bubbles only exist if borrowing constraints of agents are
frequently binding.
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Point 1. The proof is far from trivial. Here, we present a proof, inspired by that in Araujo et
al. (2011), Pascoa et al. (2011), which is different from that in the deterministic case.
Let
(
p, q, r, (ci, li, ai)
m
i=1
)
be an equilibrium. For each agent i, we define T−truncated optimiza-
tion problem
P Ti (p, q, r) : max
(ci,li,ai)∈BTi (p,q,r)
[ ∑
ξ∈DT
ui,ξ(ci,ξ)
]
where
BTi (p, q, r) :=
{
(c, l, a) = (cξ, lξ, bξ)ξ∈DT : (a) lξ = aξ = 0 ∀ξ ∈ DT ,
cξ ≥ 0, lξ ≥ 0 ∀ξ ∈ DT ,
(b) pξ0cξ0 + qξ0 lξ0 + rξ0aξ0 ≤ pξ0ei,ξ0 + pξ0Fi,ξ0(lξ−0 ) + qξ0 lξ−0
(c) ∀ξ such that 1 ≤ t(ξ) ≤ T :
0 ≤ pξRξaξ− + fi
(
qξlξ− + pξFi,ξ(lξ−)
)
pξcξ + qξlξ + rξaξ ≤ pξei,ξ + pξFi,ξ(lξ−) + qξlξ− + pξRξaξ−
(d) lξ ≤ 2L ∀ξ
}
.
Lemma 10. The problem P Ti (p, q, r) has a solution.
Proof. Since all prices and Rξ are strictly positive, borrowing constraints imply that aξ is bounded
from below. Since lξ is bounded for any ξ, it is easy to prove, by using the induction argument,
that aξ is bounded from above. By consequence, cξ is bounded. Hence, B
T
i (p, q, r) is bounded and
therefore compact.
Remark 7 (on the condition lξ ≤ 2L in definition of BTi (p, q, r)).
If we define BTi (p, q, r) as in Araujo et al. (2011), it will be not easy to prove that B
T
i (p, q, r) is
bounded (because of the presence of short-sales). Indeed, consider a two-period deterministic model;
agent i has linear productivity Fi(k) = Aik and fi = 1. If prices satify p0 = p1 = 1 = r0, q0 = 1,
q1 = R1 −A1 > 0, then the following set{
(c0, c1, l0, a0) : c0 ≥ 0, c1 ≥ 0, l0 ≥ 0 ∀ξ ∈ DT ,
p0c0 + q0l0 + r0a0 ≤ p0ei,0 + p0Fi,0(li,−1) + q0li,−1
0 ≤ R1a0 + fi
(
q1l0 + p1Fi,1(l0)
)
p1c1 ≤ p1ei,1 + p1Fi,1(l0) + q1l0 +R1a0
}
=
{
(c0, c1, l0, a0) : c0 ≥ 0, c1 ≥ 0, l0 ≥ 0 ∀ξ ∈ DT ,
c0 + (l0 + a0) ≤ ei,0 + Fi,0(li,−1) + li,−1
0 ≤ (Ai + q1)(l0 + a0)
c1 ≤ ei,1 + (A1 + q1)(l0 + a0)
}
.
is not bounded (for example, we can choose c0 = 0, c1 = 0 and a0 + l0 = 0 with a0 tends to −∞ and
l0 tends to +∞).
To encompass this difficulty, unlike Araujo et al. (2011), we impose lξ ≤ 2L. This trick helps
us to prove the boundedness of BTi (p, q, r). At the end, this condition can be removed because it is
automatically satisfied thanks to the fact that li,ξ ≤ L < 2L at equilibrium.
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We now come back to the proof of Proposition 10. Let (cTi , l
T
i , a
T
i ) be a solution of the problem
P Ti (p, q, r). The Lagrangian of the problem P
T
i (p, q, r) is
17
LT (c, l, a, λi, ηi, µi) =
∑
ξ∈DT
ui,ξ(cξ) +
∑
ξ∈DT−1
ηTi,ξlξ +
∑
ξ∈DT−1
θTi,ξ(2L− lξ) (E.1)
+
∑
ξ∈DT \{ξ0}
µTi,ξ
(
pξRξaξ− + fi
(
qξlξ− + pξFi,ξ(lξ−)
))
+
∑
ξ∈DT−1
λTi,ξ
(
pξei,ξ + pξFi,ξ(lξ−) + qξlξ− + pξRξaξ− − pξcξ − qξlξ − rξaξ
)
+
∑
ξ∈DT
λTi,ξ
(
pξei,ξ + pξFi,ξ(lξ−) + qξlξ− + pξRξaξ− − pξcξ
)]
. (E.2)
By using Kuhn-Tucker Theorem and the duality in convex programming in Florenzano and Le
Van (2001) (Chapter 7) and Rockafellar (1997) (Chapter 28), there exist non-negative sequences
(λTi,ξ)ξ∈DT , (η
T
i,ξ)ξ∈DT−1 , (µ
T
i,ξ)ξ∈DT :t(ξ)≥1, (θ
T
i,ξ)ξ∈DT−1
such that
LT (c, l, a, λTi , η
T
i , µ
T
i , θ
T
i ) ≤ LT (cTi , lTi , aTi , λTi , ηTi , µTi , θTi ) =
∑
ξ∈DT
ui,ξ(c
T
i,ξ) ≤
∑
ξ∈D
ui,ξ(ci,ξ) (E.3)
for any (c, l, a), where the last inequality in (E.3) is from the optimality of (ci, li, ai) for the original
problem (Pi(p, q, r)). This implies that∑
ξ∈DT
ui,ξ(cξ) +
∑
ξ∈DT−1
ηTi,ξlξ +
∑
ξ∈DT−1
θTi,ξ(2L− lξ)
+
∑
ξ∈DT \{ξ0}
µTi,ξ
(
pξRξaξ− + fi
(
qξlξ− + pξFi,ξ(lξ−)
))
+
∑
ξ∈DT−1
λTi,ξ
(
pξei,ξ + pξFi,ξ(lξ−) + qξlξ− + pξRξaξ− − pξcξ − qξlξ − rξaξ
)
+
∑
ξ∈DT
λTi,ξ
(
pξei,ξ + pξFi,ξ(lξ−) + qξlξ− + pξRξaξ− − pξcξ
)]
≤
∑
ξ∈D
ui,ξ(ci,ξ) for any (c, l, a). (E.4)
By choosing c = l = a = 0 in (E.4), we have, for any t ≤ T ,∑
ξ∈Dt
λTi,ξpξei,ξ +
∑
ξ∈DT−1
θTi,ξ2L ≤
∑
ξ∈D
ui,ξ(ci,ξ) <∞. (E.5)
This implies that (λTi,ξ)T≥T (ξ), (θ
T
i,ξ)T≥T (ξ) are bounded node by node.
In condition (E.4), by choosing (c, l, a) ∈ BTi (p, q, r) such that lξ = li,ξ−0 < L < 2L ∀ξ, we have
that, for any t ≤ T ,∑
ξ∈Dt−1
ηTi,ξli,ξ−0
+
∑
ξ∈Dt
fiµ
T
i,ξ(qξli,ξ−0
+ pξFi(li,ξ−0
)) ≤
∑
ξ∈D
ui,ξ(ci,ξ) <∞. (E.6)
Since li,ξ−0
> 0, we obtain that (ηTi,ξ, µ
T
i,ξ)T≥t(ξ)+1 are bounded node by node. So there is a subse-
quence (Tk)k and a non-negative sequence (λi,ξ, ηi,ξ, µi,ξ, θi,ξ) such that, for all node ξ,
(λTki,ξ , η
Tk
i,ξ , µ
Tk
i,ξ , θ
Tk
i,ξ ) −→ (λi,ξ, ηi,ξ, µi,ξ, θi,ξ) when k →∞.
17We omit multiplier associated to constraint ci,ξ ≥ 0 because at optimal we always have ci,ξ > 0 thanks
to Inada condition.
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We fixe ξ ∈ DT \DT . Applying condition (E.4) for (c, l, a) such that (cµ, lµ, aµ) = (ci,µ, li,µ, ai,µ)
∀µ 6= ξ, we have
ui,ξ(cξ) + η
T
i,ξlξ + θ
T
i,ξ(2L− lξ) + λTi,ξ
(
pξci,ξ + qξli,ξ + rξai,ξ − pξcξ − qξlξ − rξaξ
)
+
∑
ξ′∈ξ+
µTi,ξ′
(
pξ′Rξ′aξ + fi
(
qξ′ lξ + pξ′Fi,ξ′(lξ)
))
+
∑
ξ′∈ξ+
λTi,ξ′
(
pξ′Fi,ξ′(lξ) + qξ′ lξ + pξ′Rξ′aξ − pξ′Fi,ξ′(li,ξ)− qξ′ li,ξ − pξ′Rξ′ai,ξ
)
≤ ui,ξ(ci,ξ) +
∑
ξ∈D\DT
ui,ξ(ci,ξ) (E.7)
From this, we let k in the subsequence (Tk) tend to infinity, we obtain that, for any (cξ, lξ, aξ),
ui,ξ(cξ) + ηi,ξlξ + θi,ξ(2L− lξ) + λi,ξ
(
pξci,ξ + qξli,ξ + rξai,ξ − pξcξ − qξlξ − rξaξ
)
+
∑
ξ′∈ξ+
µi,ξ′
(
pξ′Rξ′aξ + fi
(
qξ′ lξ + pξ′Fi,ξ′(lξ)
))
+
∑
ξ′∈ξ+
λi,ξ′
(
pξ′Fi,ξ′(lξ) + qξ′ lξ + pξ′Rξ′aξ − pξ′Fi,ξ′(li,ξ)− qξ′ li,ξ − pξ′Rξ′ai,ξ
)
≤ ui,ξ(ci,ξ). (E.8)
Choosing (cξ, lξ, aξ) = (ci,ξ, li,ξ, ai,ξ) and noticing that li,ξ < 2L, we have
θi,ξ = ηi,ξli,ξ = µi,ξ′
(
pξ′Rξ′ai,ξ + fi
(
qξ′ li,ξ + pξ′Fi,ξ′(li,ξ)
))
= 0 ∀ξ′ ∈ ξ+. (E.9)
By using (E.8) and the definition of derivatives, we also obtain FOCs (51), (52), (53).
Let us now prove transversality condition (56).
Lemma 11. lim sup
t→∞
∑
ξ∈Dt
λi,ξ
(
qξli,ξ + rξai,ξ
) ≤ 0.
Proof. Fixe t, and take T > t, we choose (c, l, a) such that (cξ, lξ, aξ) = (ci,ξ, li,ξ, ai,ξ) ∀ξ ∈ Dt−1
and (cξ, lξ, aξ) = 0 otherwise, condition (E.4) gives that∑
ξ∈Dt
λTi,ξ
(
pξei,ξ + pξFi,ξ(li,ξ−) + qξli,ξ− + pξRξai,ξ−
)]
≤
∑
ξ∈D\Dt−1
ui,ξ(ci,ξ) ∀T. (E.10)
Let k in the subsequence (Tk) tend to infinity, we have∑
ξ∈Dt
λi,ξ
(
pξei,ξ + pξFi,ξ(li,ξ−) + qξli,ξ− + pξRξai,ξ−
)]
≤
∑
ξ∈D\Dt−1
ui,ξ(ci,ξ). (E.11)
Let t tend to infinity, notice that
∑
ξ∈D
ui,ξ(ci,ξ) < ∞ and ui,ξ(ci,ξ) ≥ 0, we obtain transversality
condition
lim
t→∞
∑
ξ∈Dt
λi,ξ
(
pξei,ξ + pξFi,ξ(li,ξ−) + qξli,ξ− + pξRξai,ξ−
)]
= 0. (E.12)
Combining this with the fact that budget constraints are always binding, we obtain
lim sup
t→∞
∑
ξ∈Dt
λi,ξ
(
qξli,ξ + rξai,ξ
) ≤ 0. (E.13)
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We have, by noting that ui,ξ(0) ≥ 0,
∞ >
∑
ξ∈D
ui,ξ(ci,ξ) ≥
∑
ξ∈D
ui,ξ(0) +
∑
ξ∈D
u′i,ξ(ci,ξ)ci,ξ ≥
∑
ξ∈D
λi,ξpξci,ξ. (E.14)
So, we get limt→∞
∑
ξ∈Dt
λi,ξpξci,ξ = 0. By combining this with Lemma 11, condition (E.12), and the
fact that budget constraints are always binding, we obtain (56) i.e., lim supt→∞
∑
ξ∈Dt
λi,ξ
(
qξli,ξ +
rξai,ξ
)
= 0.
Point 2. It is sufficient to prove the optimality of (ci, li, ai). This can be proved by using the
same argument of the deterministic case.
E.2 Proof of Proposition 12
First, take γ in Assumption 10, we will prove that (1 − γ)(qξli,ξ + rξai,ξ) ≤ Wξ ∀i,∀ξ.18 Indeed,
suppose that there exist i and ξ such that (1 − γ)(qξli,ξ + rξai,ξ) > Wξ. Let us consider a new
allocation of agent i: zi := z
(
ci, ξ, γ, (1− γ)(qξli,ξ + rξai,ξ)
)
. By noticing that γ < 1 and γF (x) <
F (γx) ∀x, we can check that this allocation is in the budget set of agent i. By Assumption 10, we
have
Ui(ci) < Ui
(
z(ci, ξ, γ,Wξ)
)
< Ui
(
z
(
ci, ξ, γ, (1− γ)(qξli,ξ + rξai,ξ)
))
. (E.15)
This is in contradiction to the optimality of (ci, li, ai).
So, we have (1−γ)(qξli,ξ+rξai,ξ) ≤Wξ ∀i,∀ξ. Taking the sum over i, we get (1−γ)qξL ≤ mWξ
∀ξ. Since L(1− γ) > 0, we get that
qξ ≤ mWξ
L(1− γ) ∀ξ. (E.16)
Point 1 of Proposition 12 is a direct consequence of (E.16).
We now prove point 2 of Proposition 12. Let us consider a process of state-price and land
dividend Γ := (γξ, dξ)ξ∈D. We will prove that limt→∞
∑
ξ∈Dt Qξqξ = 0.
We observe that dξ ≥ infi,ξ F ′i,ξ(li,ξ−) > infi,ξ F ′i,ξ(L) > 0 ∀ξ. Combining this with (64), we have
∞ > qξ0 ≥
∑
t≥1
∑
ξ∈Dt
Qξdξ ≥
(
inf
i,ξ
F ′i,ξ(L)
)∑
t≥1
∑
ξ∈Dt
Qξ. (E.17)
Therefore, limt→∞
∑
ξ∈Dt Qξ = 0. Since Wξ is uniformly bounded from above, we get that
limt→∞
∑
ξ∈Dt QξWξ = 0. According to point 1, we obtain limt→∞
∑
ξ∈Dt Qξqξ = 0.
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